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I. INTRODUCTION
Rock and roll music' has always aroused intense passions.2 Im-
mediately christened the Devil's language, rock was denounced as
a plot to "mongrelize America, ' '3 while its first popular hero, Elvis
Presley, became the target of censors across the country. Church
leaders urged boycotts and burned records, 5 while several commu-
nities banned live concert performances,6 because of the music's
overly sexual content.7
During the 1960's,8 the music, now firmly established in Amer-
1. Although this article's analysis could be applied to all forms of music, from popular
to jazz to classical, it is limited to rock and roll because that genre has been the more fre-
quent subject of censorship efforts. It should not be construed to suggest that other music is
free of opposition, nor unprotected by the first amendment. In the 1940s, for example, songs
were banned by broadcasters for their sexual content. Dougherty, From Race Music to
Heavy Metal: A Fiery History of Protests, PEOPLE, Sept. 16, 1985, at 52.
2. See, e.g., R. DUNCAN, THE NOISE: NOTES FROM A ROCK 'N' ROLL ERA (1984) (dis-
cussing rock's impact on the 1960's); J. DUNSON, FREEDOM IN THE AIR (1965); C. GILLgrr,
THE SOUND OF THE CITY, THE RISE OF ROCK AND ROLL (1983) (elaborating history of popu-
lar music); H. LONDON, CLOSING THE CIRCLE: A CULTURAL HISTORY OF THE ROCK REVOLU-
TION (1984).
3. H. LONDON supra note 2, at 24-25 (quoting a representative of the White Citizens
Council of Alabama). Much of the early opposition to rock music was linked to its role in a
supposed black plot to corrupt the minds of white youth. Id. at 36. The South served as the
anti-rock stronghold. As a result, record companies encouraged white performers to remake
songs originally distributed by black artists, to increase sales and avoid negative reaction.
Dougherty, supra note 1, at 53.
4. Clerical leaders declared that Presley was "one of the lewdest persons ever to ap-
pear on stage," while community officials declared he would not perform in their cities. P.
HAMMONTREE, ELVIS PRESLEY 20 (1985). An Oakland, California policeman was said to have
remarked, "If he did that (perform) in the street, we'd arrest him." H. LONDON, supra note
2, at 24-25.
5. The church stood at the forefront of the opposition to rock. H. LONDON, supra note
2, at 36.
6. Hartford city officials sought to revoke the state theater's license after it booked
rock acts; the Washington, D.C. police chief wanted to ban shows; Minnesota theater owners
withdrew films featuring rock music; Asbury Park, New Jersey, prohibited the music from
city dance halls; Santa Cruz barred it from civic buildings; San Antonio forbade jukeboxes.
Id. at 36, 50.
7. Frank Sinatra, in the following statements, typified the establishment viewpoint.
"'Rock 'n' roll smells phony and false. It is sung, played and written for the most part by
cretinous goons and by means of its almost imbecile reiteration and sly, lewd, in plain fact,
dirty lyrics. . . lit) manages to be the martial music of every side-burned delinquent on the
face of the earth.'" H. LONDON supra note 2, at 24-25. As one commentator noted, rock was
"consistently identified with rebellious attitudes towards sex and other moral issues." Com-
ment, Drug Lyrics, The FCC and the First Amendment, 5 Loy. L.A.L. REv. 329 (1972).
8. During the McCarthy hearings in the 1950's, popular musicians with leftist sympa-
thies found themselves abandoned by a record industry fearful of retribution. The en-
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ican society, came under increasing attack for its political bent.'
Record companies suppressed lyrics,10 communities prohibited its
most vibrant expression, the rock festival, 1 and civic auditoriums
tried unsuccessfully to prohibit performance of the musical "Hair,"
renowned for its sexual hijinks and staunch anti-war stance. 2
Vice President Spiro Agnew established a similar tone for the
1970's by consistently assailing rock music for its "blatant drug-
culture propaganda." 3 His attacks culminated in an official Fed-
eral Communications Commission ("FCC") public notice" re-
minding radio licensees of their duty not to promote songs with
drug-oriented lyrics.' 6
The advent of music videos in the 1980's has expanded the
traditional legions of those seeking to suppress rock music.' 6 The
graphic representations of the songs has triggered national concern
that many pop lyrics, videos and concert performances are both
obscene and harmful to the nation's children. Several organiza-
tions, troubled by this perceived menace to American youth, have
tertainment community "yielded to the blackmail and turned a cold shoulder on anyone
with a hint of left-wing associations." C. GILLErr, supra note 2, at 289. The Weavers, a
popular folk group, were forced to disband because of trouble obtaining bookings. "For a
few years, folk music was regarded with some mistrust by the major record companies, even
after the McCarthy fervor had died down." Id. at 289-90.
9. See infra notes 107-15 and accompanying text.
10. Topical music had "the meaning of many of the songs .. toned down to suit the
managers, agents and disc jockeys." J. DUNSON, supra note 2, at 111. Bob Dylan was a fre-
quent target of the in-house censor. He "found himself in a position of having recorded his
songs for Columbia and not having them released. Only two songs out of the twelve on his
first record were written by himself, and neither of them could be considered political in
nature." Id. at 73-74.
11. "Communities confronted with the possibility of a rock festival being held in their
area have combated the onslaught of the 'barbaric horde' with zoning laws, ordinances regu-
lating mass meetings, and, most successfully with injunctions for nuisance." Note, Rock Fes-
tivals and Nuisances, 25 ARK. L. REv. 362 (1971).
12. See infra note 86.
13. Comment, supra note 7, at 330 nn.16-17.
14. See infra notes 358-71 and accompanying text.
15. Public pressure combined with the naturally cautious inclinations of commercial
record companies to spur widespread industry self-censorship. The legal department at
MGM ruled against printing lyrics written by Frank Zappa because they were too controver-
sial. Comment, supra note 7, at 329-30.
16. Video has also enlarged its audience and transformed the music itself. See
Gelman, Rocking Video, NEwswEEK, Apr. 18, 1983, at 96 ("Rock video is standing music on
its ear; helping to revive the troubled record industry. . . . It is giving rock a way to be new
again."); Levine, TV Rocks with Music, N.Y. Times, May 8, 1983, § 6 (Magazine), at 42, col.
4 (noting record industry "sees them as the most promising marketing tool to come along in
the 20 years since the proliferation of FM rock stations"); Harrington, The Look of Rock TV
and Music, Washington Post, Aug. 28, 1983, at Ki, col. 1 (stating video has "already ef-
fected a major transformation in the music itself ... the biggest thing to hit music since
stereo").
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campaigned against the rock industry, seeking regulations that
would restrict public access to the lyrics.17 This crusade, whose ef-
fectiveness has exceeded prior music censorship activities, 8 threat-
ens to silence a vibrant medium of political and social expression.
This article will examine that movement. First, it will analyze
music's status under the Constitution. Although entertainment is
expression covered by the first amendment," the Supreme Court
has never expressly included music and lyrics among the classes of
protected speech. This article will demonstrate that regulations
aimed at rock songs must satisfy the same constitutional protec-
tions as those affecting other forms of entertainment, pursuant to
both case law and bedrock first amendment principles. It will illus-
trate that rock music, an unpopular, often unpleasant and crude
form of speech that lacks a politically-influential audience, is par-
ticularly vulnerable to the censor. The need for vigilant application
of first amendment standards is therefore acute.
Next, the article will evaluate the constitutionality of the vari-
ous proposals advanced to restrain porn rock-banning certain al-
legedly obscene records, rating albums, limiting minors' attendance
at concert performances and regulating music video content. It will
apply the first amendment's substantive and procedural safeguards
to these efforts and conclude that they largely cannot withstand
constitutional scrutiny.
The article begins with a review of the Constitution's guaran-
tee of free speech and its relationship to entertainment.
II. Music UNDER THE CONSTITUTION'S
FREE SPEECH GUARANTEE
A. The First Amendment Generally
The first amendment provides that Congress "shall make no
law ... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press. '2 0 This
constitutional guarantee, applying with equal force to the states
17. See infra notes 169-72 and accompanying text. This campaign has not been lim-
ited to the music. Both album art and music magazines have been affected. See Pornogra-
phy Charged in Rock-Album Poster, N.Y. Times, June 5, 1986, at C24, col. 6 (describing
pornography charge against rock musicians based on poster distributed with album);
Goldberg, Wal-Mart Bans LPs, ROLLING STONE, Sept. 11, 1986, at 15, (detailing retailer's
decision not to carry "nearly three-dozen rock and pop culture magazines").
18. It has been noted that this effort is the "most serious protest against rock lyrics"
since 1971. Love, Furor Over Rock Lyrics Intensifies, ROLLING STONE, Sept. 12, 1985, at 13,
13.
19. Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 501 (1952).
20. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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through the fourteenth amendment,"' is accorded an "exalted posi-
tion" among the liberties created by the Bill of Rights.22 The first
amendment obtained this stature because of its intimate relation-
ship with the democratic objectives promised in the Constitution."
The Supreme Court has stated that "it is the purpose of the
first amendment to preserve an uninhibited marketplace of
ideas."' 24 With this constitutional guarantee the framers ensured
that American society would feature "robust and wide-open" de-
bate2" on the issues affecting its politics, people and culture.2  Only
through this clash of competing thoughts, occurring free of the po-
tential constraints imposed by an authoritarian government, would
the public be adequately prepared to govern itself. 27 Therefore, the
21. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925); See also Stromberg v. California, 283
U.S. 359 (1931); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
22. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 584-85 (1951) (Douglas, J., dissenting). See
also Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 276 (1981) ("First Amendment rights are entitled to
special constitutional solicitude."); Swope v. Lubbers, 560 F. Supp. 1328, 1331 (W.D. Mich.
1983) ("First Amendment rights ...have long been regarded as among the most pre-
cious."); ACLU of Virginia v. Radford College, 315 F. Supp. 893, 896 (W.D. Va. 1970) ("It
needs no citation to suggest that First Amendment liberties have been considered as among
the most important guaranteed to citizens ....").
23. As Justice Cardozo stated, "[O]f that freedom one may say that it is the matrix,
the indispensible condition of nearly every other form of freedom. With rare aberrations
pervasive recognition of that truth can be traced in our history, political or legal." Palko v.
Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 327 (1937). See also McKay, The Preference of Freedom, 34
N.Y.U.L. REV. 1182, 1184 (1959) ("[F]reedom of expression is so vital in its relationship to
the objectives of the Constitution that inevitably it must stand in a preferred position.").
24. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969). See also Porter v.
Califano, 592 F.2d 770, 779 (5th Cir. 1979) ("The First Amendment generally favors the
marketplace testing of ideas and information .... ").
25. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964). This debate is not lim-
ited to politics, but includes "all issues about which information is needed or appropriate to
enable the members of society to cope with the exigencies of their period." Thornhill v.
Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 102 (1940). See also Red Lion Broadcasting Co., 395 U.S. at 390
(public has right to "social, political, esthetic, moral, and other ideas and experiences").
26. It is well-settled that the first amendment guarantees are not limited to political
expression. See Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 323 (1977) (political speech is
not only protected area); Red Lion Broadcasting Co., 395 U.S. at 390 (public has a right to
"social, political, esthetic, moral and other ideas and experiences"); United Mine Workers v.
Illinois Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217, 223 (1967); But cf. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Vir-
ginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (arguing
first amendment should apply only to political speech).
27. Justice Brandeis stated:
Those who won our independence believed that the final end of the state was to
make men free to develop their faculties. .. .They believed that freedom to
think as you will and to speak as you think are means indispensible to the dis-
covery and spread of political truth ... that public discussion is a political
duty; and that this should be a fundamental principle of the American
government.
Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
1986]
5
Goodchild: Twisted Sister, Washington Wives and the First Amendment: The Mov
Published by Institutional Repository, 1986
ENTERTAINMENT & SPORTS LAW JOURNAL
framers preserved the public's right to receive ideas,28 especially
unpopular expressions,2" secure in the belief that truth would ulti-
mately prevail.8 0 They were prepared to tolerate the excesses that
might result from such unfettered discussion."
Despite these broad principles, the first amendment does not
grant an absolute license to speak. 2 Certain categories of speech
are devoid of constitutional protection because they "are of such
slight social value" that any benefit occasioned by their expression
is outweighed by the "social interest in order and morality."33
They include "the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, the
insulting or 'fighting' words . . . ." In addition, the state may
prevent the publication of certain materials.3 5 Although "any sys-
tem of prior restraints" bears a "heavy presumption against its
constitutional validity,"" the government has, in certain settings,
28. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969) ("[Tlhe Constitution protects the
right to receive information and ideas."). See also Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 866-
67 (1982) ("ITIhe right to receive ideas is a necessary predicate to the recipient's meaningful
exercise of his own rights of speech, press, and political freedom."); Martin v. Struthers, 319
U.S. 141, 143 (1943) ("The right of freedom of speech . . . necessarily protects the right to
receive it."). As one Justice noted, "The dissemination of ideas can accomplish nothing if
otherwise willing addressees are not free to receive and consider them. It would be a barren
marketplace of ideas that had only sellers and no buyers." Lamont v. Postmaster General,
381 U.S. 301, 308 (1965) (Brennan, J., concurring).
29. First amendment protection does not depend on "the truth, popularity, or social
utility of the ideas and beliefs which are offered." NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 445
(1963).
30. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 503 ("[T]he basis of the First Amendment
is the hypothesis that speech can rebut speech, propaganda will answer propaganda, [and]
free debate of ideas will result in the wisest governmental policies.").
31. In Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 310 (1940), the Supreme Court stated:
"[Tihe people of this nation have ordained in the light of history, that, in spite of the
probability of excesses and abuses, these liberties are, in the long view, essential to enlight-
ened opinion and right conduct on the part of the citizens of a democracy."
32. Times Film Corp. v. City of Chicago, 365 U.S. 43, 47 (1961) ("It has never been
suggested that liberty of speech is absolute."). See also Konigsberg v. State Bar of Califor-
nia, 366 U.S. 36, 49 (1961) (rejection of view that freedom of speech is an absolute); Na-
tional Ass'n for Better Broadcasting v. FCC, 591 F.2d 812, 817 (D.C. Cir. 1978) ("Of course,
not all speech is protected by the First Amendment. ... ); Theriault v. Carlson, 495 F.2d
390, 394 (5th Cir.), cert. denied 419 U.S. 1003 (1974) ("First Amendment freedoms are not
absolute.").
33. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942).
34. Id. But see New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (holding state libel
laws constrained by constitutional limitations).
35. See Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 570 (1976) (all prior restraints
are not constitutionally infirm); Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 558
(1975) ("prior restraints are not unconstitutional per se").
36. Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963). The government bears "a
heavy burden of showing justification for the imposition of such a restraint." Organization
for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 419 (1971).
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been able to justify such restrictions."'
Speech can be suppressed when it advocates illegal conduct,"8
while commercial speech has less extensive first amendment rights
than other forms of expression. 9 States may also enact reasonable
time, place and manner restrictions on the exercise of these free-
doms.40 Regulations in these areas, however, must be carefully
crafted so as to ensure that protected speech is not inadvertently
inhibited.' 1
B. Entertainment and the Constitution
The Supreme Court initially refused to grant entertainment
first amendment protection. In Mutual Film Corp. v. Industrial
Commission of Ohio, the Court held that motion pictures did not
deserve a constitutional harbor:
37. The cases authorizing prior restraints have largely concerned national security is-
sues. See Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507 (1980) (restraining publication of former CIA
agent's book concerning experiences with agency); United States v. Marchetti, 466 F.2d 1309
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1063 (1972) (enjoining disclosure of CIA secrets by former
agency official); Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. v. Colby, 509 F.2d 1362 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 421
U.S. 992 (1975) (enjoining disclosure of CIA secrets by former agency official); United States
v. Progressive, Inc., 486 F. Supp. 5 (W.D. Wis. 1979) (enjoining disclosure of magazine arti-
cle detailing intricacies of H-bomb). See also New York Times Co. v. United States, 403
U.S. 713, 730 (1971) (recognizing need for courts to authorize prior restraint in issues involv-
ing basic "international relations and national defense"). All prior restraints, however, must
be accompanied by certain procedural safeguards. See infra notes 54-56 and accompanying
text.
38. See infra notes 334-36 and accompanying text.
39. "[C]ommercial speech receives a limited form of First Amendment protection so
long as it concerns a lawful activity and is not misleading or fraudulent. . . . [Sipeech may
be restricted only if the government's interest in doing so is substantial, the restrictions
directly advance the government's asserted interest, and the restrictions are no more exten-
sive than necessary to serve that interest." Posadas De Puerto Rico Associates v. Tourism
Company of Puerto Rico, 106 S. Ct. 2968, 2976 (1986) (citing Central Hudson Gas & Elec-
tric Corp. v. Public Service Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980)). But see Linmark Associates,
Inc. v. Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85 (1977) (state may not ban commercial speech merely be-
cause it is harmful).
40. To be valid, a time, place and manner restriction must satisfy the following three-
part test:
(a) it must be content-neutral;
(b) serve a significant government interest; and
(c) leave open alternative channels for communicating the information.
Metromedia, Inc. v. San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 516 (1981).
41. See NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. at 433 ("Because First Amendment freedoms
need breathing space to survive, government may regulate in the area only with narrow
specificity.")(citing Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 311 (1940)); Ashton v. Kentucky,
384 U.S. 195, 200 (1966) ("When First Amendment rights are involved, we look even more
closely lest, under the guise of regulating conduct that is reachable by the police power,
freedom of speech or of the press, suffer.").
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It cannot be put out of view that the exhibition of moving pic-
tures is a business pure and simple, originated and conducted
for profit, like other spectacles, not to be regarded, nor intended
to be regarded by the Ohio constitution, we think, as part of the
press of the country or as organs of public opinion."'
Thirty years later the Court reconsidered this holding, but
only in dicta. 43 It was not. until 1948, in Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v.
Wilson, that the Court overruled Mutual Film." The Court rea-
soned that movies were a "significant medium for the communica-
tion of ideas" that impacted on American social and political life.4 '
The Court ruled it immaterial that this expression entertained,
rather than informed, the public.
The Court rejected the contention that motion pictures forfeit
their first amendment shelter because they are conducted for
profit, analogizing movies to newspapers and other publications
sold in the marketplace.46 Significantly, the Court disregarded the
state's argument that films were somehow more dangerous to the
community's youth because of their pervasive influence.47
First amendment protection has since been extended to other
forms of entertainment, 8 while obscene speech of all forms has
gone unprotected. 9
42. 236 U.S. 230, 244 (1915).
43. United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 166 (1948) ("We have no
doubt that moving pictures, like newspapers and radio, are included in the press whose
freedom is guaranteed by the First Amendment.").
44. 343 U.S. 495 (1952). See also Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433
U.S. 562, 578 (1977) ("There is no doubt that entertainment ... enjoys First Amendment
protection."); Associated Film Distribution Corp. v. Thornburgh, 683 F.2d 808, 811 (3rd Cir.
1982) ("Motion pictures contain protected speech.").
45. Joseph Burstyn, Inc., 343 U.S. at 502. The Court noted that movies "may affect
public attitudes and behavior in a variety of ways, ranging from direct espousal of a political
or social doctrine to the subtle shaping of thought which characterizes all artistic expres-
sion." Id. at 501.
46. Id. at 501-02.
47. Id. at 502.
48. See, e.g., Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61 (1981) (dance); South-
eastern Promotions, Ltd., v. City of Atlanta, Ga., 334 F. Supp. 634 (N.D. Ga. 1971) (theater
productions); Adams Theatre Co. v. Keenan, 12 N.J. 267, 270, 96 A.2d 519, 520 (1953) ("The
performance of a play or show, whether burlesque or other kind of theatre, is a form of
speech and prima facie expression protected . . . ."). But cf. Murdock v. City of Jackson-
ville, Fla., 361 F. Supp. 1083 (M.D. Fla. 1973) (professional wrestling is not speech);
America's Best Family Showplace Corp. v. City of New York, Dept. of Bldgs., 536 F. Supp.
170 (E.D.N.Y. 1982) (video games not protected).
49. When the Constitution was adopted, at least 10 states had statutes prohibiting
obscene publications. At first, the Supreme Court did not expressly rule that obscenity was
unprotected, merely assuming that "the primary requirements of decency may be enforced
against obscene publications." Near v. Minnesota ex ret. Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931). In
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The most recent history of entertainment and the first amend-
ment has largely been a story of the struggle by communities to
ban allegedly obscene films 50 and other offensive programing.5
These crusaders have waged this battle, like those opposing rock
music, to preserve public morals, shelter children from unsuitable
entertainment, and uphold basic community virtues. Despite the
loftiness of these aims, courts, bound by a long tradition of re-
sisting efforts to restrict even the most unpopular speech, have re-
mained defiant.52 As a result, only obscene entertainment cannot
claim the first amendment's shield;5. generally, expression that
falls short of this standard, even if sexually-oriented, may not be
prohibited.5
The state's power to regulate obscene speech under these stan-
Roth v. United States, the Court held that speech "utterly without redeeming social impor-
tance" dealing with sex in a way so as to appeal to the "prurient interest" as defined by the
contemporary community standards was outside the scope of the first amendment. 354 U.S.
476, 484, 487, 489 (1957).
50. See, e.g., Verani, Motion Picture Censorship and the Doctrine of Prime Re-
straint, 3 Hous. L. REV. 11 (1965) (detailing history of administrative censorship); Com-
ment, Permissive Bounds of Prior Restraint of Movies, 17 DEPAUL L. REV. 597 (1968)
(chronicling municipal censorship ordinances); Note, "For Adults Only": The Constitution-
ality of Governmental Film Censorship By Age Classification, 69 YALE L.J. 141 (1959) (re-
viewing classification schemes).
51. See, e.g., Comment, Exclusion of Children From Violent Movies, 67 COLUM. L.
REV. 1149 (1967) (discussing regulation aimed at preventing violence); Comment, The Ap-
plicability of General Public Lewdness Statutes to Live Theatrical Performances, 5 VAL.
U.L. REv. 184 (1970) (noting that 35 states have lewdness provisions); Note, Rock Festivals
and Nuisance, 25 ARK. L. REV. 362 (1971) (reviewing efforts to prevent rock concerts).
52. See infra notes 77-90 and accompanying text.
53. The courts have had considerable trouble defining obscenity. It is not unreasona-
ble to suggest that there may be no objective definition. Justice Stewart's oft-cited instruc-
tion remains appealing. He wrote that he considered obscenity to be only hard-core
pornography:
I shall not today attempt further to define the kinds of material I understand to
be embraced within that shortened description; and perhaps I could never suc-
ceed in intelligibly doing so. But I know it when I see it, and the motion picture
involved in this case is not that.
Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964).
54. The Supreme Court established the modern test for obscenity in Miller v. Califor-
nia, 413 U.S. 15 (1973). This standard resulted from several reworkings. In Roth, the Court
defined obscenity as material "utterly without redeeming social importance," dealing with
sex in a way so as to appeal to the "prurient interest." 354 U.S. at 489. Nine years later, the
Court altered this standard in Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413 (1966). Obscenity
was material whose dominant theme appealed to the prurient interest that is patently offen-
sive and without redeeming social value. This standard resulted in few materials being judi-
cially determined obscene. See A Book Named John Cleland's Memoirs v. Attorney General
of Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413 (1966) ('Fanny Hill' not obscene); Attorney General v. A
Book Named 'Naked Lunch', 351 Mass. 298, 218 N.E.2d 571 (1965) ('Naked Lunch' not
obscene).
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dards, however, is not unlimited."5 In Freedman v. Maryland, the
Court held that a prior restraint of even obscene films is valid
"only if it takes place under procedural safeguards designed to ob-
viate the dangers of a censorship system."56 There are several ele-
ments a constitutionally permissible structure must contain. First,
the procedure must assure prompt final judicial review and not be
administered in a manner which would lend an effect of finality to
the censor's decision.5 7 Second, this judicial decision" cannot be ex
parte.59 Third, the burden of proof in this proceeding "that the
film is unprotected expression must rest on the censor."60 Finally,
any censorship order resulting from this system must be narrowly
drawn.6' The Court subsequently held that Freedman s is not lim-
ited to "direct suppression" restraints, but applies to indirect sys-
tems that prevent distribution of speech as well, including classifi-
cation systems for motion pictures.6 The courts must overturn any
system of regulation that fails to provide these protections."
The Court also developed two substantive limitations on ob-
scenity regulation-the vagueness and overbreadth doctrines. The
former provides that statutes defining illegal conduct in terms so
55. The Miller test is generally considered a higher standard than Roth. In a compan-
ion case, decided the same day, the Court recognized that states may limit even consenting
adults' access to pornographic material. Paris Adult Theater I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973).
56. 380 U.S. 51, 58 (1965). See also Teitel Film Corp. v. Cusack, 390 U.S. 139, 141
(1968) (procedural safeguards required); Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U.S. 717, 731
(1961).
57. Freedman, 380 U.S. at 58-59. The Freedman Court identified the rationale under-
lying the need for judicial review:
The administration of a censorship system for motion pictures presents peculiar
dangers to constitutionally protected speech. Unlike a prosecution for obscenity,
a censorship proceeding puts the initial burden on the exhibitor or distributor.
Because the censor's business is to censor, there inheres the danger that he may
well be less responsive than a court. . . to the constitutionally protected inter-
est in free expression.
380 U.S. at 57-58.
58. Restraints imposed prior to judicial involvement "must similarly be limited to
preservation of the status quo for the shortest fixed period compatible with sound judicial
resolution." Id. at 59.
59. See Carroll v. President and Commissioners of Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175, 180
(1968) (Ex parte temporary restraining orders allowed only on a showing that "it is impossi-
ble to serve or notify the opposing parties and to give them an opportunity to participate.");
A Quantity of Books v. Kansas, 378 U.S. 205, 211 (1964) (adversary hearing must be
provided).
60. Freedman, 380 U.S. at 58.
61. Carroll, 393 U.S. at 184.
62. The Freedman Court also held that the burden of "proving that the film is unpro-
tected expression must rest on the censor." 380 U.S. at 58.
63. Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. Dallas, 390 U.S. 676, 688 (1968).
64. Blount v. Rizzi, 400 U.S. 410, 416-17 (1971).
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vague and indefinite as to cause individuals of common intelligence
to guess at their meaning are void. 5 The overbreadth doctrine
states that ordinances which proscribe unprotected activities must
not sweep protected speech within their ambit6 s These twin safe-
guards ensure that protected speech is not deterred under the
premises of regulating obscenity, thereby inhibiting the creative
and artistic drive of entertainers.
State regulations aimed at restricting minors' exposure to al-
legedly obscene entertainment have created special problems for
the courts, because they pit several important values against each
other. On one side is the state's interest in protecting children's
well-being from potentially harmful sexual materials. 7 Matched
against this community exigency are three aims-preserving the
parents' traditional role in rearing children,68 ensuring that young
people are prepared for participation as adults in America's open
society"e and the minors' own first amendment rights.7 0 The resolu-
65. Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241 (1967). A statute will fail on vagueness grounds if
it either "forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common
intelligence must necessarily guess as to its meaning and differ as to its application . .. .
Id. at 249 (citing Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926)). Justice
Brennan has written that vague statutes fail to provide adequate notice to those affected,
chill speech, and invade the buffer zone for free speech under the first amendment. Paris
Adult Theaters I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. at 86-87 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
66. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940). The rationale behind this doctrine is to
discourage the chilling effect of ordinances and prevent selective enforcement of speech. The
Court, however, has recently limited its scope. See Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601
(1973) (requiring substantial overbreadth in certain settings); Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S.
134 (1974) (requiring significant degree of overbreadth in other situations).
67. "[B]asic in a democracy, stand the interests of society to protect the welfare of
children. ... Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 165 (1944). The threat to a child's
psyche from obscene and other inappropriate matter can include "emotional excitement and
psychological or physical injury." Id at 170.
68. As the Court noted in Prince:
[I]t is cardinal with us that the custody, care and nurture of the child reside first
in the parents, whose primary function and freedom include preparation for ob-
ligations the state can neither supply nor hinder . . . . And it is in recognition of
this that these decisions have respected the private realms of family life which
the state cannot hinder.
321 U.S. at 166.
69. Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 868 (1982) ("[Jjust as access to ideas makes
it possible for citizens generally to exercise their rights of free speech and press in a mean-
ingful manner, such access prepares students for active and effective participation in the
pluralistic, often contentious society in which they will soon be adult members."); Prince v.
Massachusetts, 321 U.S. at 168 ("A democratic society rests for its continuation upon the
healthy, well-rounded growth of young people into full maturity as citizens.").
70. The Court has recognized that minors have first amendment rights. See Tinker v.
Des Moines Independent Community School District, 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (students can
wear symbolic black armbands); West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624
(1943) (school children cannot be required to engage in flag salutes).
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tion of this conflict has special importance for rock musicians be-
cause their audience is largely composed of minors.
The Supreme Court has recognized that children possess a
"significant measure of first amendment protection."" Neverthe-
less it has granted states greater discretion to restrict minors' ac-
cess to sexual materials than would be tolerated in regulations
aimed at adults.7 2 States are free to define obscenity in terms that
vary with age and can therefore limit materials which are harmful
to children, but not obscene for adults .7  The regulations may not
infringe on adults' freedom of expression 74 and, except in "narrow
and well-defined circumstances," may not circumscribe protected
speech 75 even to shield them from objectionable matter.76
C. Rock Music and the Constitution
The Supreme Court has never determined whether music is
entitled to the liberties described above. The following analysis in-
dicates that rock songs and their lyrics deserve such protection.
1. LOWER COURTS RECOGNIZE PROTECTION FOR SONGS
Four circuit courts of appeal have considered the first amend-
ment's application to music. They are unanimous in recognizing
that songs are included in the constitutional guarantee of free
speech.
The leading case is Cinevision Corp. v. City of Burbank.77 The
city council sought to prevent certain rock concerts on the grounds
that they would attract drug users and other undesirable elements
to their community. 78 The Ninth Circuit ruled that this action vio-
71. Erznoznik v. Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 212-13 (1975).
72. Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968). See also Erznoznik, U.S. at 212-13.
73. Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 635-39. See also New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982)
(states may employ different obscenity standard to protect children); Custom Theatres Mid-
west States, Inc. v. City of Fort Wayne, 473 F.2d 1297, 1300 (7th Cir. 1973) ("A state or city
because of its strong and abiding interest in its youth is not without the authority to limit
the access to minors of material which would be objectionable as to them, but which would
not be obscene in its appeal to adults.").
74. High 01' Times, Inc. v. Busbee, 456 F. Supp. 1035, 1042 (N.D. Ga. 1978), afl'd, 621
F.2d 141 (5th Cir. 1980).
75. Erznoznik, 422 U.S. at 213-14.
76. "Speech that is neither obscene as to youths nor subject to some other legitimate
proscription cannot be suppressed solely to protect the young from ideas or images that a
legislative body thinks unsuitable to them." Id.
77. 745 F.2d 560 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 2115 (1985).
78. The city had contracted with a local promoter to provide musical entertainment in
the municipal amphitheater. The arrangement had proceeded smoothly for several years
until an "outspoken opponent of the concerts" was elected to the City Council and began
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lated the promoter's first amendment rights, holding that "music is
a form of expression protected by" the Constitution.79
The Seventh Circuit held that an attempt to ban music at a
liquor-serving bar violated the Constitution"0 because music, even
if presented without words, constituted protected speech for first
amendment purposes.81 And the Third Circuit likewise recognized
that the music was protected in holding that a string band's selec-
tion of its songs for performance in a parade was sanctioned by the
Constitution.8 2 The Second Circuit recently became the fourth cir-
cuit to hold that "musical entertainment is a form of protected
speech.""3
Several other courts have considered the question of regula-
tions aimed at suppressing live performances of music without
reaching the issue of the Constitution's application to the songs
and the lyrics. The issue was addressed by the Supreme Court
which held that live entertainment is protected by the first amend-
ment.84 In Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim,85 the Court in-
cluded musical performances within this guarantee, but did not de-
cide whether the music standing alone deserved constitutional
protection.8"
The overwhelming majority of lower courts considering this is-
objecting to some of the shows. Id. at 565-66. Rejected were Blue Oyster Cult, Jackson
Browne, Roxy Music, Todd Rundgren, Patti Smith and Al Stewart; accepted were Robert
Palmer and Poco. Id. at 566 n.1. The court noted that the council's reasoning "considered
arbitrary and unlawful factors" in rejecting the concerts. Id. at 576. Smith and Rundgren
were thought to attract homosexual crowds, others predominantly black audiences, and still
others opponents of nuclear power. Id. at 576-79.
79. Id. at 567. The decision recognized the first amendment interests of concert pro-
moters in order to preserve "the right of public access to protected expression." Id. at 568.
It noted the public must rely on concert promoters to obtain bookings of performers, similar
to booksellers and theater owners.
80. Reed v. Village of Shorewood, 704 F.2d 943, 950-51 (7th Cir. 1983). The plaintiff
alleged that the defendant city officials interfered with his business and harassed him into
selling his bar because his establishment featured rock music. Id. at 947-48.
81. Id. at 950.
82. Tacynec v. City of Philadelphia, 687 F.2d 793, 796 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S.
1172 (1983).
83. Calash v. City of Bridgeport, 788 F.2d 80, 82 (2nd Cir. 1986). The city had rejected
a promoter's request to hold a Beach Boys concert in a facility controlled by the
municipality.
84. Schacht v. United States, 398 U.S. 58, 61 (1970).
85. 452 U.S. 61, 65 (1981).
86. Id. at 62-63. The Supreme Court's decision in Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v.
Conrad, 420 U.S. 546 (1975), considered a municipality's attempt to prevent the perform-
ance of the pop musical 'Hair.' The case, however, hinged on whether the municipal theater
could be considered a public forum, and not the constitutional rights of producers to present
performances.
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sue have held that the first amendment protects the right to stage
both rock concerts87 and rock musicals.8 The rationale for these
cases is simple. At the heart of the attempts to stop these perform-
ances is the belief of certain community members that the music is
offensive. Yet the courts have rejected these contentions. They
have recognized that live rock productions and concerts are no dif-
ferent than other forms of protected entertainment performances
and 9 thus, cannot be prohibited based on their "message, ideas,
subject matter, content, popularity or social utility."90
Some courts, however, elevating the concerns of local munici-
palities over the performers' first amendment rights, have enjoined
the performance of rock concerts. During the 1970's, several rock
festivals were prohibited because of their destructive impact on the
community.91 One court's 2 explanation typified their reasoning:
87. Fact Concerts, Inc. v. City of Newport, 626 F.2d 1060, 1063 (1st Cir. 1980), rev'd
on other grounds, 453 U.S. 247 (1981) (first amendment protects right to produce jazz con-
certs despite community's fear that Blood, Sweat and Tears concert would attract unruly
crowd); Goldstein v. Town of Nantucket, 477 F. Supp. 606, 608 (D. Mass. 1979) ("[The]
plaintiff's public performance of Nantucket's traditional folk music is clearly within the
scope of protected first amendment expression."); People of State of New York v. Remeny,
359 N.Y.S.2d 504, 506, 79 Misc. 2d 160 (Crim. Ct. 1974), aff'd, 367 N.Y.S.2d 146 (App. Div.
1975) rev'd, 40 N.Y.2d 527, 387 N.Y.S.2d 415, 355 N.E.2d 146 (1976) (jazz concert is pro-
tected expression); State ex rel. Pizza v. Tom S. A., Inc., 428 N.E.2d 878, 880, 68 Ohio Misc.
19, 22 Ohio Ops. 3d 309 (Ohio Com. Pl. 1981) (rejecting argument that rock concert loses its
constitutional protection because staged for profit). See also Davenport v. City of Alexan-
dria, 710 F.2d 148 (4th Cir. 1982) (live musical entertainment is protected speech).
88. Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. City of Mobile, Alabama, 457 F.2d 340, 340-41
(5th Cir. 1972) (musical production "Hair" is speech and entitled to first amendment pro-
tection); Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. City of West Palm Beach, 457 F.2d 1016, 1018
(5th Cir. 1972); Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. City of Atlanta, Georgia, 334 F. Supp.
634, 638-39 (N.D. Ga. 1971); P.B.I.C., Inc. v. Byrne, 313 F. Supp. 757, 761-62 (D. Mass.
1970), vacated, 401 U.S. 987 (1971), vacated, 413 U.S. 905 (1973). One other court upheld
'Hair's' claim of access to a local civic auditorium, but on equal protection grounds. South-
eastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, 459 F.2d 282, 283 (10th Cir. 1972).
89. Goldstein v. Town of Nantucket, 477 F. Supp. at 608. See also People v. Adals,
114 Misc. 2d 773, 452 N.Y.S.2d 543, 546 (Crim. Ct. 1982) ("Live performances, however, are
no less a mode of expression or speech than books or film; live performances are entitled, no
less than books or film, to the same protection of the First and Fourteenth amendments
against unlawful censorship.").
90. State ex rel Pizza v. Tom S. A., Inc., 428 N.E.2d at 880.
91. Stepping Stone Enterprises, Ltd. v. Andrews, 531 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir.), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 823 (1976) (town has broad powers to protect health and safety or citizens); Plan-
ning & Zoning Comm'n v. Zemel Brothers, Inc., 29 Conn. Supp. 45, 58, 270 A.2d 562, 569
(Conn. Super. Ct. 1970) (rock festival would "interfere substantially with the rights of the
general public"); Preble v. Song Mountain, 62 Misc. 2d 353, 308 N.Y.S.2d 1001 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1970) ("the proposed open-air concert... would, if conducted, interfere substantially
with the rights of the general public"); County of Sullivan v. Filippo, 64 Misc. 2d 533, 544,
315 N.Y.S.2d 519, 539 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1970) (rock festival would have "imposed an unreason-
able and excessive burden" on residents); Drew v. Town-Mac, Inc., 61 Misc. 2d 55, 304
N.Y.S.2d 1003, (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1969) (noting adverse effects on public and municipality).
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In addition to . ..traffic congestion, . . . problems concerning
sanitary facilities, living accommodations and fresh water and
food for the anticipated crowd. . . . [t]here is a very clear po-
tential of danger to the public health, safety and general wel-
fare. .. .The potential for harm to the community far out-
weighs any good which might be derived from such an event."
None of these cases concerning concerts decides whether the
songs standing alone are protected speech. Nevertheless, by apply-
ing first amendment standards to live musical performances, the
courts are assuming that the underlying songs themselves are pro-
tected. The concert is merely the means of dissemination. To limit
these cases to providing that the constitutional guarantee of free
speech applies only to the live performance, and not the music it-
self, makes little sense. A court is unlikely to protect distribution
of material that is itself not covered by the first amendment.94 The
rock festival cases can be distinguished as upholding the state's
right to regulate the speech's time, place, and manner, rather than
-as placing music outside the first amendment.
2. ROCK AS THE EXPRESSION OF IDEAS
Despite these cases indicating that music is protected, one
commentator has argued that rock songs should not be held within
the constitutional free expression guarantee because they are not
speech.5 This contention is largely based on the distinction be-
tween the music and the lyric, the song's two separate components.
While the latter qualifies as speech, 6 it is asserted that music can-
92. A Connecticut court rejected a promoter's first amendment freedom of association
claim as "wholly without merit." Zemel Brothers, Inc., 29 Conn. Supp. at 63, 270 A.2d at
571. A New York court ruled that a town's injunction against a rock festival resulted in "no
unreasonable or discriminatory proscription of any of the First Amendment rights ....
County of Sullivan v. Filippo, 64 Misc. 2d at 557, 315 N.Y.S.2d at 542.
93. Drew v. Town-Mac, Inc., 61 Misc. 2d at 58, 61, 304 N.Y.S.2d at 1008, 1009. One
court recently upheld a town's revocation of a promoter's permit to use its concert facility
for fear of disruption. See Contemporary Music Group, Inc. v. Chicago Park District, 57 Ill.
App. 182, 372 N.E.2d 982 (Ill. App. Ct. 1978).
94. See, e.g., Goldstein v. Town of Nantucket, 477 F. Supp. at 608, holding that "[tihe
substance [folk music] and not merely a method of expression is protected by the First
Amendment ......
95. "Whether musical expression is protected by the first amendment depends upon
whether music is considered to be speech. If music is not speech, then it follows that it is
subject to no first amendment protection." Comment, Music The Universal Healer: First
Amendment Protection-Real or Illusory?, 7 N.C. CENT. L.J. 329, 346 (1976).
96. Note, Musical Expression and First Amendment Considerations, 24 DE PAUL L.
Rzv. 143, 159 (1974) ("[T~he lyric portion of a song is clearly speech within any conception
of the word .... 9%
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not. As one student-author noted, citing Plato and Aristotle for au-
thority, music communicates nothing 7 and thus, because the first
amendment applies only to ideas, songs must fall outside its
scope.98
These arguments are based on the perception that the music
alters the constitutionally protected lyrical content. "[Wihen
words are interwoven into a piece of music, the 'speech' of the mu-
sic takes on a special definition." e Langer has suggested that
"when words and music came together in song, music swallows
words."1°°
Such assertions are, however, misplaced. Music cannot be ra-
tionally distinguished from other forms of protected entertain-
ment.10' Music is a "significant medium for the communication of
ideas," similar to motion pictures that the Supreme Court has
found "affect public attitudes and behavior in a variety of ways,
ranging from direct espousal of a political or social doctrine to the
subtle shaping of thought which characterizes all artistic
expression."1 0 2
Music satisfies the same criteria. It is a vibrant medium for
the expression of ideas. Rock speaks for the younger generations, a
group that has often found itself without the means to articulate
97. Note, Drug Songs and the Federal Communications Commission, 5 U. MICH. J.L.
REF. 334, 345 n.72 (1971) ("(Tlhere is no plausibility in arguing that music advocates any-
thing at all."). Advanced in the Note is the theory that people respond to music's aesthetic
and not its lyrical content.
98. Id. (citing Kingsley International Pictures Corp. v. Regents of the Univ. of the
State of N.Y., 360 U.S. 684 (1959)). The author, however, reads this case's contention that
"the first amendment's basic guarantee is of freedom to advocate ideas," 260 U.S. at 688,
too broadly. The Supreme Court has never held that only pure speech is protected. See
Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405 (1974) (placing a peace symbol on American flag); Shut-
tlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147 (1969) (marching); Edwards v. South Caro-
lina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963) (protest demonstrations).
99. Comment, supra note 95 at 345.
100. S. LANGER, FEELING AND FORM 152 (1953). This author has also asserted that "in
a well-wrought song the text is swallowed, hide and hair." S. LANGER, PROBLEMS OF ART 84
(1957).
101. Although outside the scope of this article, it could be asserted that the music
even standing alone deserves constitutional protection. As the Supreme Court held in Cohen
v. California, some speech:
serves a dual communicative function: it conveys not only ideas capable of rela-
tively precise, detached explication, but otherwise inexpressible emotions as well
.... We cannot sanction the view that the Constitution, while solicitous of the
cognitive content of individual speech, has little or no regard for that emotive
function which, practically speaking, may often be the more important element
of the overall message sought to be communicated.
403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971).
102. Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 501 (1952).
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its values and beliefs. 103 Since its development, the music has con-
veyed its attitudes and outlook, serving as messenger for its vision.
Even politicians have taken to studying it to attract young vot-
ers.10' Those who argue that songs are devoid of expressed ideas
have not bothered to explore or examine American history since
the 1950's. A short review is therefore in order.
Rock's creation during the 1950's mirrored the adolescent's
uneasiness with America, as it became "a visible retreat from con-
formity ... the music became the focus of a counterculture."105
Popular music revealed the young's desire to shake up American
society and inject vitality into an otherwise sedate nation, content
on enjoying post-war prosperity and calm.10
The 1960's were rock's heyday as the new generation's great
communicator. Music was the "language" for the rebellion that
spread across college campuses and onto the streets.1 07 As one ob-
server wrote:
[R]ock 'n' roll turned out to be much more than just the latest
sound, indeed much more than just the music. From it emerged
new ideas of style, a new sense of beauty, new attitudes toward
things in general, new values .... It was rock 'n' roll ... that
defined the rebellion of the late sixties and was its essential
spirit and vitality, its very heart. More than anything else, rock
'n' roll defined the rebellious generation, that plurality of Ameri-
cans who began as the baby boom and wound up as Woodstock
Nation and who in turn, more than anything else, have defined
103. Children have often had trouble making their elders listen. This is closely related
to the lack of respect granted rock's audience. One national news magazine described heavy
metal adherents, for example, as "a crowd of tuned-out working-class white adolescent
males who drink too much beer and whoop it up for the thunderous guitar licks and outra-
geous stage antics. The major social impact of a heavy-metal concert is belching." Cocks,
Rock is a Four-Letter Word, TiME, Sept. 30, 1985, at 71, 71. The following discussion merely
singles out some of the more widely-known messages. It would be impossible, and quite
unnecessary, to track down each message.
104. See Dowd, Why are all the Politicians Watching Rock Video?, N.Y. Times, Apr.
19, 1985, at A19, col. 2.
105. H. LONDON, supra note 2, at 30. Elvis Presley's "sneer, his whole attitude, exem-
plified the scornful indifference of James Dean .... His was the style of playful irrever-
ence, a style that appealed to the young who were dissatisfied with conformity, yet not sure
of how to express noncomformity." Id. at 20.
106. Famous disc jockey Murray the K stated: "'Rock was just a new expression
which reflected a belief that younger people did not accept society as it was laying down the
laws of what you can do and what you can't do.'" Id. at 38.
107. Id. at 179. One commentator added that "[ffor the reality of what's happening
today in America, we must go to rock 'n' roll, to popular music." Gleason, Like A Rolling
Stone, in THE AGE OF RoCK 61 (J. Eisen ed. 1969).
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contemporary America."'
Like the folk songs of the 1920's that spurred the labor move-
ment,109 and the sing-alongs of the 1950's that comforted the civil
rights workers,110 rock was both the anti-war campaign's inspira-
tion and its loudspeaker."' The music"' provided the young access
to the public and enabled them to articulate their desires for the
nation's future.11 3 Rock was the vehicle through which their anger
and frustration with society was distilled into productive commen-
tary." Concerts assumed a particular importance, offering a meet-
ing place where the young could gather to make their statement.18
The next decade, considerably less turbulent, was marked by a
decline in- social consciousness, an increased desire for material
goods, and reduced interest in politics."' The music changed with
society. "Glitter rock," with its emphasis on showmanship and its
108. R. DUNCAN, supra note 2, at 14.
109. Music played an integral role in the development of organized labor. The Indus-
trial Workers of the World campaign was "a singing movement in which all the members
knew, loved and sang the songs." J. DUNSON, supra note 2, at 16. The Congress of Industrial
Organizations "used song in organizing campaigns." Id. at 16-17.
110. Dunson wrote that "[wihen police clubs, snarling dogs and hoses start to attack
the line of march, praying to one's self gives some courage, but when hundreds sing their
hopes together the songs provide the shield and identification necessary to withstand even
the fury of a hostile mob." Id. at 66-67.
111. Most of the discussion on rock's influence and expression in the 1960's centers on
the end of the decade, when the impact was much more visible. But rock also spoke for the
young in the early 1960's, when the revolution was in its infancy. In fact, it bridged the gap
between the decades. Bob Dylan is generally credited with being the key figure. "His success
forced other large commercial companies to listen to the audience tapes of topical singers
.... "Freewheelin'" ["The Freewheelin' Bob Dylan" album] spread more radical ideas to
more people in a few short months than all the northern protest meetings and marches since
1960." J. DUNSON, supra note 2, at 74-75.
112. The songs reflected the "social conscience of the nation" and its young peo-
ple. Id. at 11.
113. These concerns were primarily stopping the war in Vietnam, the creation of a
more open and free society, unemployment and continuing the civil rights progress of the
late 1950's and early 1960's. Id. at 60, 114-15.
114. Robert Palmer, the N.Y. Times' influential rock critic, commented that:
[R]ock was rebel music. Stars like Bob Dylan and the Rolling Stones wrote and
recorded outspoken lyrics that urged sweeping social change and an end to war
and flirted with the rhetoric of revolution. They sang openly about sex and
drugs. The music was the voice of a new generation and a constant reminder of
the generation gap. The battle lines were drawn.
Palmer, What Pop Lyrics Say To Us Today, N.Y. Times, Feb. 24, 1985, § 2, at 1, col. 3.
115. San Francisco Promoter Bill Graham's concert hall was a popular home for these
gatherings. He later said that the "'people who came to the place where I worked were in
our church, our meeting place, and while they were there they expressed themselves in a
special way, mentally and spiritually. We were involved in a common cause.'" H. LONDON,
supra note 2, at 143.
116. C. LASCH, THE CULTURE OF NARcissisM (1978).
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diminished concern for lyrical content, mirrored this new direc-
tion.'17 The modern "me generation" found expression in escapist
disco music and fantasy techno-pop that matched its new and less
serious values;11 8 music was often said to reflect the country's gen-
eral malaise.119
During the 1980's two disparate trends emerged in music, mir-
roring a tension in American society between the spirit of the
1960's and the more relaxed mood of the 1970's. On one side are
strongly sexually-oriented songs, which express the desires of a he-
donistic culture. 120 Competing with this current, however, are mu-
sicians writing songs with overtly political content, rather than
simple vehicles for escaping reality.'
This brief history of the messages rock has carried for Ameri-
can youth to their elders is compelling evidence that music does
indeed convey ideas. Arguments that songs are not speech because
the music has subsumed their lyrical content belie this rich tradi-
tion and ignore modern music's role in society. It cannot provide a
serious rationale for excluding rock music from constitutional
protection.
117. "The mainstream rock of the 1970's produced little in the way of socially relevant
lyrics." Palmer, supra note 114, at 28, col. 4.
118. One critic charged that "the music had become particularly stagnant, pretentious,
boring, a commodity rather than a force. Audiences weren't moved, they were anesthetized,
assailed not by ideas but postures. . . . Concerts reinforced the distance between perform-
ers and fans, who were perceived simply as consumers." Harrington, Punk Mortem, The
Music's Faded, But Its Influence Lingers On, Wash. Post, Mar. 30, 1986, at H5, col. 1. This
blas6 attitude captured by the music meshed with the times. President Carter felt so con-
cerned that he sought to reinvigorate the country with a nationwide address discussing this
malaise.
119. Many, however, felt repressed by the money-oriented nature of both music and
society. They turned to punk, whose violent anti-establishment stance and nihilistic politics
represented a throwback to rock's traditional posture as an agent for social change. "(P]unk
was all opposition against the old . . . [it] was created not by media but by teen-age musi-
cians desperate to make rock 'n' roll exciting and worthwhile again, to keep a promise made
30 years ago." Id. at col. 2, 6. It was angry music for those who resented the new values.
120. It is music for the "yuppie," concerned more with glamor, than with content. See
Gelman & Wang, They Live to Buy, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 31, 1984 (detailing the rise of a new
generation more concerned with material goods). Madonna is perhaps the best example. Her
hit single "Material Girl" captured the essence of this thinking: "Only boys that save their
pennies Make my rainy day . . . We're living in a material world, And I'm a material girl."
Her "carefully calculated image has struck a chord among many of today's more affluent
young listeners . . . ." Palmer, supra note 114, at 28, col. 1.
121. See infra notes 150-68 and accompanying text.
19861
19
Goodchild: Twisted Sister, Washington Wives and the First Amendment: The Mov
Published by Institutional Repository, 1986
ENTERTAINMENT & SPORTS LAW JOURNAL
3. TOO OFFENSIVE AND OBNOXIOUS FOR FIRST AMENDMENT
PROTECTION?
The real opposition to first amendment protection for rock
music seems to stem from the nature of the ideas themselves and
the manner in which the artists have chosen to express them. The
primary objection to applying constitutional safeguards appears
rooted in the offensiveness of the songs and their graphic represen-
tation in videos.' A review of any listing of popular songs since
the 1950's reveals the basis for this revulsion. Heavy metal, which
has a particularly strong following among adolescent males, alleg-
edly draws some of its lyrical inspiration from satanic rituals and
devil worship.2 3 Black leather is the accepted dress code and the
songs often contain exhortations to violence.24 Dance music, with
a pulsating rhythm and throbbing beat, employs strongly sugges-
tive sounds and lacy lingerie to communicate its message. 2 5 Sev-
122. Video has intensified the reaction. As one critic wrote:
Music video clips have made rock performers widely visible as they brandish
their guitars and, sometimes, wear as little clothing as a Ziegfeld Follies chorus
girl. Studded leather outfits, spiky haircuts and the kind of hip-wiggling that got
Elvis Presley censored on the Ed Sullivan show in the 1950's are accessible to
every television watcher. The esthetics of current rock performance clearly of-
fend some observers.
Pareles, Should Rock Lyrics Be Sanitized?, N.Y. Times, Oct. 13, 1985, § 2, at 1, 5, col. 1. A
National Council of Churches report concluded that "[h]eavy viewing of music videos may
significantly increase violence in our society because it closely links erotic relationships with
violence performed not by villains but by teenage idols." Powell, What Entertainers Are
Doing To Your Kids, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Oct. 28, 1985, at 46, 46.
123. The group AC/DC has been a popular target of scorn. A national magazine re-
ported, "Richard Ramirez charged with 16 'Night Stalker' murders on the West Coast, is
said by friends to have been obsessed by satanic themes in the music of the heavy-metal
band AC-DC and its album 'Highway to Hell.'" Powell, supra note 122, at 46. The maga-
zine linked another murder to heavy-metal. AC/DC has denied the connection between Sa-
tan and its music. Harrington, Bedeviling Rumors, Wash. Post, Nov. 20, 1985, at B2, col. 3.
See also Wildmon, Industry Won't Act; Outlaw the Sick Lyrics, USA Today, Oct. 11, 1985,
at 10A, col. 7 (heavy metal "legitimizes rape, murder, forced sex, sado-masochism, adultery,
etc.").
124. From the rock group Metallica, "Bang your head against the stage like you never
have before. Make it rain, make it bleed, make it really sore .... We are gathered here to
maim and kill, for this is what we choose." From Twisted Sister, "They think we are fools
who want to make their own rules. It only gets us madder .... If they don't want to play,
then let's make them pay. Shoot them down with a fucking gun." Music and the Lyrics of
Records: Hearings Before the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and Transporta-
tion, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 14-5 (1985) [hereinafter cited as Rock Hearings].
125. Prince, the most popularly acclaimed performer, has traditionally been singled
out. One lyric from his hit single "Darling Nikki" has been oft-cited: "I met a girl named
Nikki. I guess you could say she was a sex fiend. I met her in a hotel lobby masturbating
with magazines." Id. at 16. From Vanity, "Come on and stroke me, strap this thing tight, if
you want to glide down my hallway, it's open." From Morris Day, "I wanna get you off baby.
You can straddle my brass. As we dance in the land of hard and soft, if the kid can't make
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eral groups, including the Rolling Stones, have frequently drawn
the wrath of feminists for depictions of sexual violence directed at
women.
12 6
But no matter how disgusting these subjects may be to some
in the community, this repugnance does not justify holding music
outside the first amendment.127 The Supreme Court has consist-
ently held that expressions do not lose their constitutional protec-
tion "merely because the ideas are themselves offensive to some of
their hearers."' 128 Speakers are free to advance even the most ob-
noxious statements, 2 9 so long as their communications are not ob-
you come, nobody can." Other acts under attack include Sheena Easton for her single
"Sugar Walls" ("I can tell you want me; you can't hide; your body's on fire; come inside");
Cyndi Lauper, for "She Bop" ("I can't stop messing with the danger zone," a thinly veiled
reference to masturbation); Vanity for "Nasty Girl" ("I can't take it . .. . I want seven in-
ches or more tonight"); Shalamar for "Dancin in the Sheets" ("So wrap around me baby
. . . let's dance in the sheets. ... ); Bruce Springsteen for "I'm on Fire" ("Hey little girl,
is your daddy home, did he go away and leave you all alone, I got a bad desire. Oh, I'm on
fire.").
126. At the Senate hearings, the Parents' Music Resource Center ("PRMC"), an or-
ganization comprised primarily of wives of congressmen, cited several examples. From the
Rolling Stones, in their song "Tie You Up": "The pain of love, you dream of it, passion it.
You even get the rise from it. Feel the hot come dripping on your thigh from it. Why so
divine, the pain of love." From AC/DC, in "Squealer": "She said she had never been balled
before, and I don't think she'll ball no more. Fixed her good." From Judas Priest, in "Eat
Me Alive": "Squealing in passion as the rod of steel injects. Gut wrenching frenzy that en-
rages every joint. I am going to force you at gunpoint to eat me alive." Rock Hearings, supra
note 124, at 14-17. Although there has been a shift away from rock lyrics that demeaned
women, "many of today's pop lyrics continue to celebrate male dominance. Aggressively
macho rock has been making a comeback." Palmer, supra note 114, at 28, col. 3.
127. As a leading first amendment scholar wrote,
[Tihe fact that given speech is thought by many to be highly offensive, either
because it espouses political, religious, racial or other doctrines which to many
are most abhorent, or because of its use of 'indecent' words, does not, absent a
showing of likely and imminent antisocial conduct arising from such speech, con-
stitute a ground for abridging speech. Offensiveness per se is an anti-speech in-
terest, which does not outweigh the countervailing speech interest.
M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH: A TREATISE ON THE THEORY OF THE 1ST
AMENDMENT, § 2.05[B] (1984).
128. Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 592 (1969). See also Waters v. Chaffin, 684
F.2d 833, 837 (11th Cir. 1982) (that plaintiff "chose to express his ideas in language some
might find offensive is not, in and of itself, enough to override his interest in speaking
freely"); Beckerman v. City of Tupelo, Mississippi, 664 F.2d 502, 509 (5th Cir. 1981) ("In
almost every instance it is not acceptable for the state to prevent a speaker from exercising
his constitutional rights because of the reaction to him by others."); Russo v. Central School
District No. 1, 469 F.2d 623, 633-34 (2nd Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 932 (1973)
("[Blecause the First Amendment ranks among the most important of our constitutional
rights we must recognize that the precious right of free speech requires protection even
when the speech is personally obnoxious.").
129. Courts have upheld individuals' right to advocate several offensive theories. See
Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405 (1974) (flag desecration); Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 916 (1978) (Nazi march through predominantly Jewish
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scene or within one of the other classes of unprotected speech.8
The recent "Washington Wives" campaign has demonstrated
that many Americans disagree with rock's message. The unpopu-
larity of some musical ideas does not offer a basis for denying them
first amendment protection. Although many forms of speech are
"provocative and challenging," and thrive on the conflict between
ideas, the Supreme Court has held the first amendment protects
them all.13' Dispute, disagreement, and controversy are all encom-
passed within the first amendment's protection and "a controver-
sial and minority point of view is not the less protected because it
is disliked.' 3 2
Another often cited basis for excluding music from first
amendment protection is its alleged lack of redeeming social
value.' The argument runs that because rock's contribution to
the public discourse is so limited, it does not deserve a constitu-
tional license to be free of regulation. The Constitution, however,
does not tolerate such an evaluation of the worth of ideas.13 4 The
first amendment exists to protect the dissemination of ideas, and
to prevent the government from passing judgment on their content
and value. 3 ' This reasoning offers no support for exempting music
neighborhood); Invisible Empire Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v. City of West Haven, 600
F. Supp. 1427 (D. Conn. 1985) (expressions by KKK);. See also Toward a Gayer Bicenten-
nial Committee v. Rhode Island Bicentennial Foundation, 417 F. Supp. 632, 642 (D. R.I.
1976) ("No ideas are so far beyond the pale of the wider community's values that they are
beyond the boundaries of the First Amendment."). "[T]he First Amendment requires that
we tolerate a certain amount of speech in forms that are not soothing to the ear or pleasing
to the eye." Southern New Jersey Newspapers v. New Jersey, 542 F. Supp. 173, 187 (D. N.J.
1982). Nor are its protections "exclusively reserved for polite and tactful utterances ... "
Clary v. Irvin, 501 F. Supp. 706, 709 n.9 (E.D. Tex. 1980).
130. See supra notes 53-76 and accompanying text. See also Glasson v. City of Louis-
ville, 518 F.2d 899, 904 (6th Cir. 1975) ("No state may agreeably to the Constitution inter-
cept a message and remove it from the channels of communication or punish its dissemina-
tion solely because of its content unless it is obscene ....
131. Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1949) (The "function of free
speech... is to invite dispute. It may indeed best serve its high purpose when it induces a
condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with conditions as they are, or even stirs people
to anger.").
132. Wiegard v. Seaver, 504 F.2d 303, 306-07 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 924
(1975).
133. Senator Ernest Hollins reported that "the redeeming social value that I find is
inaudible ... it is outrageous filth." Rock Hearings, supra note 124, at 2.
134. Waters v. Chaffin, 684 F.2d 833, 837 (11th Cir. 1982) ("[Tjhe first amendment's
protections do not turn on the social worth of the statements. ... ). See also Perry v.
Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 499 F.2d 797, 802 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 883
(1974) ("Freedom of expression does not extend only to approved ideas, it means freedom to
express any idea."); Liberty Lobby, Inc. v. Pearson, 390 F.2d 489, 490 (D.C. Cir. 1968) ("The
First Amendment protects ideas regardless of their merit. ... ).
135. "The Constitution protects expression.. . without regard to the race, creed, or
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from the free speech guarantee.
The final rationale for not extending constitutional protection
to rock music is that it threatens to erode American moral stan-
dards."' A community's efforts to uphold these values by enacting
reasonable regulations directed at rock should not be frustrated by
the strict analysis demanded by the first amendment. 137
This thesis amounts to an improper attempt to impose a
moral orthodoxy on American society 8" and cannot justify holding
music beyond the first amendment's reach.139 Members of one
group may not halt the dissemination to others in society of mate-
political or religious affiliation of the members of the group which invokes its shield, or to
the truth, popularity, or social utility of the ideas and beliefs which are offered." NAACP v.
Button, 371 U.S. at 444-45 (1963). The court is not to at as a judge of the value of the
speech. The Tenth Circuit, nevertheless found a magazine article a "gross, unpleasant,
crude, distorted attempt to ridicule." Pring v. Penthouse Int'l, Ltd., 695 F.2d 438, 443 (10th
Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1132 (1983). The court conceded, however, that the story
was still protected by the first amendment, which "is not limited to ideas, statements, or
positions which are accepted . . . .[N]o matter how great its divergence may seem from
prevailing standards, this does not prevent application of the First Amendment. The First
Amendment standards are not adjusted to a particular type of publication ...." Id.
136. Millie Waterman, a PTA official, remarked that "'There are many songs which
include lyrics ... that send messages that may be dangerous to individuals or society.'"
Harrington, The Capitol Hill Rock War, Wash. Post, Sept. 20, 1985, at B6, col. 4.
137. The proponents of regulations contend that the music has desensitized individu-
als to immoral conduct. As one commentator explained, "[tihe concern is less that children
will emulate the frenzied behavior described in porn rock than they will succumb to the
lassitude of the demoralized-literally the de-moralized. . . porn rock [can make] even the
vilest things somehow banal." Will, No One Blushes Anymore, Wash. Post, Sept. 15, 1985,
at D7, col. 2. Senator Paul Trible (R-Va.) stated at the Senate Hearings that "when we are
constantly confronted by that which is coarse, we become coarsened. Repeated exposure to
song lyrics describing rape, incest, sexual violence, and perversion is like sandpaper to the
soul . . . .One becomes literally demoralized." Rock Hearings, supra note 124, at 3.
138. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) ("If there
is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can
prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opin-
ion ...."). See also Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 872 (1982) (efforts to prescribe
what will be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion are inva-
lid); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 308 (1940) ("[A] State may not unduly suppress
free communication of views, religious or other, under the guise of conserving desirable con-
ditions."); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 402 (1923) (The Constitution forbids forcing
children to be taught in such a way as to "foster a homogeneous people.").
139. Justice Douglas illustrated the dangers of upholding such regulations:
Any test that turns on what is offensive to the community's standards is too
loose, too capricious, too destructive of freedom of expression to be squared with
the First Amendment . . . .I can understand (and at times even sympathize)
with programs of civic groups and church groups to protect and defend the ex-
isting moral standards of the community .... [11f the First Amendment guar-
antee of freedom of speech and press is to mean anything in this field, it must
allow protests even against the moral code that the standard of the day sets for
the community.
Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 512-13 (1957).
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rial the group finds offensive. 10 As the Ninth Circuit held in
Cinevision,
City Council members expressed desire to inculate the "proper"
community values in its youth cannot justify Burbank's efforts
to ban "hard rock" music. .. .The first amendment limits gov-
ernmental efforts to inculate values, at least when such efforts
serve to suppress or stifle other forms of protected expression."'
This last rationale is similar to the other reasons articulated in
support of excluding music from the first amendment's guarantee
of free speech. They all share the same basic theory-rock is some-
how less worthy of protection than other forms of entertainment.
All fail for essentially the same reason. They ignore the Supreme
Court's dictate that none "of the great liberties insured by the
First [amendment] can be given higher place than the others."'142
The Constitution is not a music critic. 43 The state cannot bar en-
tertainment that merely "falls far short of anyone's idea of
'art' .144 Attempts to hold rock outside the Constitution because
of its obnoxious and unpopular message offend the first amend-
ment's basic principles.14
4. ROCK MUSIC AS POLITICAL SPEECH
The need for rock music to be accorded complete first amend-
ment protection is demonstrated by the political nature of many of
140. Dworkin v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 611 F. Supp. 781, 787 (D. Wyo. 1985) ("All
citizens must live with the realization that every other citizen also has protected rights.").
141. Cinevision v. City of Burbank, 745 F.2d 560, 573. See also Paris Adult Theaters I
v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 110 (1973) ("[I]f a State, to maintain or create a particular moral
tone, may prescribe what its citizens cannot read or cannot see, then it would ...follow
that in pursuit of that same objective a State could decree that its citizens must read certain
books or must view certain films.").
142. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. at 164 (1944). See also Robinson v. Price, 615
F.2d 1097, 1099 (5th Cir. 1980). But cf. Young v. American Mini Theaters, 427 U.S. 50
(1976) (suggesting all speech may not be equal); FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726
(1978).
143. Norma Kristie, Inc. v. City of Oklahoma City, 572 F. Supp. 88, 91 (W.D. Okla.
1983).
144. Piarowski v. Illinois Community College, 759 F.2d 625, 628 (7th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 106 S. Ct. 528 (1985). The issue of obscenity will be discussed infra notes 293-325 and
accompanying text.
145. The remedy for those who are offended by the exhibition or public display of
rock music is to personally ignore it. "[Tihe burden normally falls upon the viewer to 'avoid
further bombardment of [his] sensibilities simply by averting eyes." Erznoznik, 422 U.S. at
210-11. But cf. Redrup v. New York, 386 U.S. 767 (1967) (display of obscene materials can
be limited).
[Vol. 3:131
24
University of Miami Entertainment & Sports Law Review, Vol. 3, Iss. 2 [1986], Art. 2
http://repository.law.miami.edu/umeslr/vol3/iss2/2
THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND ROCK MUSIC
the lyrics.14 6 Throughout its history, rock music has advanced po-
litical messages. 1 4  Rock's most powerful expression occurred dur-
ing the 1960's, when it served as a rallying cry for the anti-war and
civil rights movements.148 Although the music of the Seventies was
relatively neutral, rock has experienced a political reawakening in
the 1980's. Popular musicians are again "addressing issues, and
challenging their listeners to actively confront the world around
them. There have probably been more angry protest lyrics written
and recorded in the last three or four years than in any comparable
period of the 60's.'4 9 A sample of these viewpoints is necessary to
document the political character of the music and the pressing ne-
cessity for first amendment protection.
During the past two years, all-star collections of the music in-
dustry's biggest attractions have united on behalf of several differ-
ent worldwide causes. Spurred by the international community's
apathy towards starvation in Africa, an unheralded British rock
performer launched a fund-raising crusade that raised millions of
dollars, 60 and, more importantly, focused the world's attention on
the hunger problem. 151 A similar frustration with the federal gov-
ernment's inaction to rescue the failing American agricultural
economy spawned "Farm Aid," a movement dedicated to helping
146. This is not to suggest that all rock music is political. Much of it is not. But this is
immaterial for constitutional purposes because "[elntertainment as well as political and ide-
ological speech is protected." Schad, 452 U.S. at 65. See also NAACP v. Alabama ex rel.
Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958) ("[I]t is immaterial whether the beliefs sought to be
advanced by association pertain to political, economic, religion or cultural matter .... ");
Tacynec, 687 F.2d at 799. The fact that some lyrics are political means that rock needs first
amendment protection so that the political content is not suppressed under the guise of
halting the obscene.
147. See supra notes 103-121 and accompanying text.
148. See supra notes 107-15 and accompanying text.
149. Palmer, What Pop Lyrics Say to Us Today, N.Y. Times, Feb. 24, 1985, § 2, at 1,
col. 3.
150. The effort began after Irish rocker Bob Geldof observed television news reports of
the suffering in Ethiopia. Appalled, he collected several colleagues to record "Do They
Know It's Christmas." The song raised almost $10 million and became the largest selling
single in British history. Goldberg, USA for Africa, ROLLING STONE, Mar. 14, 1985, at 11.
Versions of similar all-star collections sprouted throughout the world. In America, 45 per-
formers gathered in a Los Angeles studio to record "We Are The World," which raised $44.5
million on its own. ROLLING STONE, May 8, 1986, at 21. The entire effort has netted almost
$100 million, culminating with "Live Aid," a worldwide concert. See Wash. Post, Jan. 31,
1985, at B2, col. 1.
151. The impact of "We Are the World" was enormous. It garnered tremendous na-
tional interest, appearing on the cover of most major magazines and dominating the broad-
cast media. The song simply forced otherwise uninterested American politicians to become
concerned with the Ethiopian people's plight. See Gold, Rock's Finest Hour, PEOPLE, Feb.
25, 1985, at 28 (describing recording session).
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the nation's beleaguered farmers.1 52 Another group of musicians,
unhappy with the direction of American policy toward minority
rule in South Africa, recorded "Sun City," a stinging and biting
rebuke to apartheid. 153
Although these efforts have garnered tremendous publicity,
other political currents have found expression in rock music. The
successful Irish group U2 has been a strong proponent of pacifism,
naming one of their albums for a series of paintings by the Japa-
nese survivors of one of the the World War II nuclear attacks.15
Rap music, adopting the language of the ghetto, has argued for na-
tional attention to the black community's difficulties and mounting
anger.155 Songs are written to oppose American involvement in
Central Americal" and with nuclear power, 5 7 while musicians reg-
152. Farm Aid developed from Bob Dylan's remark at Live Aid that American farmers
needed a similar benefit. Harrington, Bob Dylan, Ready to Roll, Wash. Post, Apr. 16, 1986,
at D7, col. 4. Unlike "We Are The World," its sole emphasis was on individual concerts by a
variety of country and rock stars. Its first show was less successful than its sister fund-
raising effort, but still raised almost $1 million on behalf of farmers. ROLLING STONE, May 8,
1986, at 21.
153. The video "Sun City," featuring a diverse array of musicians, was the most bla-
tantly political of these movements. Its album and video had difficulty garnering alrplay,
because of "commercial radio's antipathy and conservatism . Harrington, Going for A
Knockout, Wash. Post, Feb. 26, 1986, at C7, col. 5.
154. A critic described a U2 album as employing "the sounds of militarism-rat-a-tat-
tat drums, savage guitar work, defiant vocals-in the service of pacifism, albeit a pacifism
ready to wage moral battle with its enemies." Connelly, Keeping the Faith, ROLLING STONE,
Mar. 14, 1985, at 25.
155. "The Message" by Grandmaster Flash and the Furious Five is illustrative:
A child is born with no state of mind, blind to the ways of mankind
God is smiling on you but He's frowning too
Because only God knows what you'll go through
You'll grow in the ghetto living second rate
And your eyes will sing a song of deep hate
The places you play and where you stay
Looks like one great big alleyway
It was plain to see that your life was lost
You was cold and your body swung back and forth
But now your eyes sing the sad song
Of how you lived so fast and died so young
So don't push me 'cause I'm close to the edge
I'm trying not to lose my head
It's like a jungle
Sometimes it makes me wonder how I keep from going under.
156. The British group The Clash, for example, entitled an album "Sandinista!" and
included songs attacking the military draft, superpower politics, and American imperialism
in the region. See Hall, The Year of the Clash, ROLLING STONE, Aug. 19, 1982, at 28
(describing group's politics).
157. Musicians United for Safe Energy ("MUSE") organized in 1978 to warn the coun-
try of the dangers of increased reliance on nuclear power. MUSE conducted several concerts
in New York City, and released both an album and a movie netting $600,000 for the anti-
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ularly conduct live performances for a variety of causes including a
recent concert tour for political prisoners. "
Perhaps the most significant political trend in American music
today is the populism inherent in the work of several major record-
ing artists, 59 particularly Bruce Springsteen.' 0 His recent album
documents the plight of the common man, struggling to withstand
the complexities of the modern age. Its heroes are the industrial
workers, embittered and confused by the decline of smokestack
America, the Vietnam veteran, returned from the war "with no
place to go" and the private citizen, helplessly observing the decay
of his hometown. 1 ' Springsteen and other musicians have articu-
lated the frustrations of these people while assailing present ad-
ministration policies.' 62 These artists have subtly reminded audi-
nuclear power cause. Some Concerts that Worked, and Some that Didn't, PEOPLE, Feb. 25,
1985, at 33.
158. Several artists formed a two-week, six-city tour to benefit Amnesty Interna-
tional's efforts to aid political prisoners. Pareles, Amnesty Concert in Jersey, N.Y. Times,
June 16, 1986, at C14, col. 3. See also Harrington, Going for a Knockout, Wash. Post, Feb.
26, 1986, at 7, col. 5 (noting plans for an antidrug concert and other performances aimed at
helping veterans, Transafrica, and the Americans for Peace in the Americas Committee);
Harrington, Concert Season Blooms, Wash. Post, Mar. 26, 1986, at D7, col. 6 (noting music
fund-raisers).
159. This movement started with the so-called "recession-rockers" who began in the
early 1980's arguing that "times are tough, but faith and hope are still possible" despite the
economic decline of the nation. Palmer, Rock Singers Are Trying To Tell Us Something,
N.Y. Times, July 10, 1981, at C22, col. 1. They are now known as the "Blue Collar Brigade."
SPIN, Nov. 1985, at 45. Their message has been described as a broad-based working-class
consciousness." Harrington, supra note 118, at H5, col. 6.
160. Springsteen is not the only such musician, but he above the others has "made a
populist message genuinely popular." Pareles, Bruce Springsteen-Rock's Popular Populist,
N.Y. Times, Aug. 18, 1985, at H1, col. 2, H7, col. 6. Others in this vanguard include John
Cougar Mellencamp (focusing on small town life and farmers), Billy Joel (the unemployed),
Bob Seger (Detroit auto workers), Tom Petty (Southern youth), and Bryan Adams (Cana-
dian youth).
161. See Miller, Return of the Rock Heros, NEWSWEEK, June 18, 1984 at 100, 100. ("he
evokes the American dream running on empty"); Holden, What the Charts Say About the
Health of Pop Music, N.Y. Times, May 5, 1985, at H23, col. 1 ("His songs, mostly despair-
ing dramatic monologues by blue collar workers who have lost touch with the American
dream, portray the dissolution of hope and community experienced by working-class
America in a post industrial age."); Pareles, supra note 160, at H7, col. 1. ("Springsteen
takes an old-fashioned populist approach-he speaks, and sings, for the inarticulate and
disenfranchised."); Barol, Uehling, Greenberg & Doherty, He's On Fire, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 5,
1985, at 48, 54 [hereinafter cited as Barol] ("Springsteen and his fans share above all a
conviction that music means something-that properly applied, rock and roll can heal bro-
ken hearts, mend shattered lives, light the way through hard times or at least ease the pain
for one thrilling moment.").
162. Springsteen had largely avoided politics until this tour. In Tacoma, he remarked
that, "'[t]his is a song about blind faith. Like when the President talks about arms con-
trol.'" Barol, supra note 161, at 50. In Washington, he told the audience, "'[n]ext time
there's a war, they're gonna ask you to go. And in order to find out about the situation,
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ences of their responsibility to these people. 163 Politicians sought
to claim the Springsteen message for their own, only to meet with
reproach." ' One cultural critic wrote that Springsteen's songs are
unmistakably radical in their defiance of authority, their empa-
thy for the common man, and their burning class resentments.
Springsteen is now doing something more difficult and more val-
uable than Bob Dylan did during the early 1960s ...[he] is
singing against the whole national drift toward Reaganism, ma-
terialism, narcissism, union-baiting, media timidity, and cultural
conformity.165
It is not difficult to identify the political viewpoints expressed
by Springsteen and other musicians. The messages are easily dis-
cerned and generally contrary to the mainstream political ideology
or countervailing government policies.16 They often urge the lis-
tener to oppose those positions. As such, they are particularly vul-
nerable to censorship.
Without first amendment constraints on their discretion, state
and local officials would have broad authority to suppress songs
that advocate unpopular ideas or offer opinions with which they
disagree. Regulations, enacted under the pretense of shielding chil-
you're gonna need to know a lot more than you hear on the 6 o'clock news. Where we're
going now is pretty scary.'" Peisch, Bruce Springsteen Scores Big in USA Stadium Debut,
USA Today, Aug. 6, 1985, at Dl, col. 1. In New Jersey, he warned that "'big chemical
companies are poisoning our state" and noted that the audience had a "responsibility to
... the homeless and hungry. A lot of people are falling through the bottom. They ain't
getting caught in any safety net.'" VILLAGE VOICE, Sept. 24, 1985, at 28.
163. During the 1984-85 concert tour, Springsteen urged the audience to contribute to
local food banks and personally donated $10,000 to several. Barol, supra note 161, at 50.
164. The Republicans tried first. President Reagan told a campaign crowd,
"'America's future rests in a thousand dreams inside your hearts. It rests in the message of
hope in songs of a man so many young Americans admire-New Jersey's own Bruce Spring-
steen.'" Flippo, Bruce Springsteen, PEOPLE, Dec. 24-31, 1984, at 29, 29. The artist re-
sponded, "'I kinda got to wondering what his favorite album must've been . . . .I don't
think he's been listening to this one,'" before launching into one of his angriest songs about
an unemployed worker eventually driven to murder. Cocks, 'Round the World, A Boss
Boom, TIME, Aug. 26, 1985, at 68, 71.
The Democrats were next. Presidential candidate Walter Mondale remarked that
"'Bruce may have been "born to run" but he wasn't born yesterday.'" Flippo, supra at 29.
New Jersey Senator Bill Bradley claimed the Springsteen message in a lengthy newspaper
article and on television talk shows. Yet Springsteen declined to accept this banner, noting
in an interview, "'I want to try and just work more directly with people; try to find some
way that my band can tie into the communities that we come into. I guess that's a political
action .... Human politics.'" Loder, Bruce Springsteen, ROLLING STONE, Dec. 6, 1984, at
21. He has continued to look for ways to "bypass" the electoral process. Id.
165. VILLAGE VOICE, Sept. 24, 1985, at 28, 28.
166. ROLLING STONE, Nov. 7, 1985, at 10. ("As a vital and often raw form of expression,
rock tends to dance on the outer edge of what society finds acceptable. It always has.").
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dren from offensive lyrics, could be applied to prevent political
commentary by rock artists. If the constitutional guarantee of free
expression has any meaning, it is that government officials must be
denied this kind of discretion over political speech.167
Some in the rock industry already suspect that the political
songs are the next, if not the real, target.168 They noted that the
movement against "porn rock" arrived shortly after popular musi-
cians rediscovered politics. One asserted that "music is getting po-
litical again, and some political forces want to put music back in
its place," while others refer to the affiliation of the "Washington
Wives" and their prominent husbands as proof of this connec-
tion.'19 To ensure that rock's political content is not altered or de-
termined by government officials, first amendment protection is
essential.17 0
167. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 745-46 (1978). See also Cohen v. California,
403 U.S. 15, 24 (1971) ("It [the first amendment] is designed and intended to remove gov-
ernmental restraints from the arena of public discussion. . . ."); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310
U.S. 88, 101-02 (1940) ("The freedom of speech . . . embraces at the least the liberty to
discuss publicly and truthfully all matters of public concern without previous restraint or
fear of subsequent punishment.").
168. Singer John Cougar Mellencamp has been a leader of the movement to oppose
the "porn rock" campaign. He stated:
"It's easy to be passive. But all of a sudden these forces sneak up on you and it's
too late. Right now, it's sex and violence; before long it'll be, "That's just too
political." This is the way it all started in the 1950's, with the blacklisting of
actors and actresses. We are under some kind of right-wing attack .... I've got
a song about the farmers. . . .That song might get censored, because I've got a
line about "blood on the plow." But it's not just myself; there are a lot of artists
with politically-overtoned songs, and they're going to suffer because of sex and
violence."
Pareles, Debate Spurs Hearings On Rating Rock Lyrics, N.Y. Times, Sept. 18, 1985, at C21,
col. 2, 4.
169. Cocks, supra note 103, at 71, col. 2. The PMRC has been the primary group
seeking restraints on rock lyrics. Its letter to the president of the Recording Industry Associ-
ation of America initiated the campaign. Of its seventeen initial signers, nine were wives of
Republican politicians, many of whom are closely aligned to, or members of, the present
administration. Molutsky, On the Uses of Power by Marriage, N.Y. Times, Sept. 29, 1985,
at 60, col 4.
170. It is "[a] fundamental purpose of the First Amendment. . .to foreclose govern-
mental control or manipulation of the sentiments uttered to the public." Main Road v.
Aytch, 522 F.2d 1080, 1087 (3rd Cir. 1975). See also Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 557
(1965) ("It is clearly unconstitutional to enable a public official to determine which expres-
sions of view will be permitted and which will not. ... ); Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ.,
431 U.S. 209, 234-35 (1977) ("[A]t the heart of the First Amendment is the notion that an
individual is free to believe as he will, and that in a free society one's beliefs should be
shaped by his mind and his conscience rather than coerced by the State.").
1986]
29
Goodchild: Twisted Sister, Washington Wives and the First Amendment: The Mov
Published by Institutional Repository, 1986
160 ENTERTAINMENT & SPORTS LAW JOURNAL
III. REGULATING ROCK: APPLYING FIRST
AMENDMENT STANDARDS
This article now turns to an examination of the specific first
amendment problems raised by particular modes of regulations af-
fecting rock music171
A. Placing Warning Labels on Rock Album Covers
1. FROM PTA TO PMRC TO POLITICAL ACTION
The primary goal of the national effort to restrain "porn rock"
has been the creation of a standardized rating system for music,
similar to the motion picture code. The issue first appeared in Oc-
tober 1984 at the National Conference of Parents and Teachers
Association ("PTA") annual meeting.17 2 The group, concerned with
the growth of sexually explicit lyrics, contacted the major record
companies and suggested the formation of a panel to consider la-
beling rock albums.1 73 Despite its broad membership, the PTA's
171. One form of regulation-beyond the scope of this article, but nonetheless signifi-
cant-is the denial of immigration visas to foreign rock performers. The U.S. Immigration
and Naturalization Service has recently denied several applications for work permits by
British bands. The groups' rejection notices asserted that the bands would not be paid
enough for their performances at less than prestigious facilities to satisfy the requirements
and that they had "no artistic merit." Harrington, Let Me In, Immigration Man, Wash.
Post, Nov. 20, 1985, at B7, col. 4. The paper reported that "British music newspapers had
speculated that the denials were related to the recent controversy over sexually explicit rock
lyrics . ... ." Id. One of the groups, New Model Army, is known for its political and social
songs. Id.
The Supreme Court held that Congress has broad authority to exclude aliens from the
country, largely free of first amendment restrictions. Kleindeinst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753
(1972). The McCarran-Walter Act of 1952 gives the government the power to exclude aliens
who hold certain positions or espouse specific opinions. 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (1982). Several au-
thors have been denied admission to the country recently because of their political beliefs.
See Hentoff, George Shultz and the Writers, Wash. Post, Jan. 18, 1986, at A23, col. 1 (not-
ing Reagan administration policy concerning visas); Writers and Visas, Wash. Post, Jan. 18,
1986, at A22, col. 1 (urging reform of McCarran-Walter Act). See also Abourezk v. Reagan,
785 F.2d 1043 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (limiting government's power to exclude aliens for national
security purposes); Note, The Ideological Exclusion of Invited Aliens: Should the United
States Require a Higher Level of Tolerance by its Citizens than It Must Demonstrate It-
self?., 1 GEoR. IMMIG. L.J. 61 (1985) (reviewing recent case law).
172. Harrington, Discord On Record Warning, Wash. Post, Aug. 29, 1985, at G1, col. 1.
The PTA has been critical of the PMRC although the two have worked closely together. A
PTA official stated that the PMRC is "getting involved in what radio stations play on the
air and asking labels to reconsider signing artists [with explicit material) and we don't agree
with that .... [Wle're not affiliating with groups attacking a particular performer or push-
ing a censorship point of view." Id. at G14, col. 4.
173. The PTA's June 1984 resolution urged recording companies "to consider the ex-
plicit contents of some songs and their responsibility to an unsuspecting public" and label
rock records, according to National PTA Vice President Millie Waterman. Rock Hearings,
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solicitation was ignored. 17 4
But everyone paid attention 175  when the wives of several
prominent Washington politicians formed the PMRC in May
1985.'1 They sought to require the Recording Industry Association
of America ("RIAA") to implement a uniform rating system and to
make printed lyrics available to parents.17 The RIAA responded
by rejecting the PMRC proposals as "totally impractical.'178 In-
stead the RIAA offered a compromise,' suggesting an industry-
wide "printed inscription" on records identifying "blatant, explicit
lyric content" to inform those concerned parents and children to
supra note 124, at 89.
174. Recording Industry president Stanley Gortikov responded with a letter rejecting
the PTA proposal on grounds that "'Ithere are wide variations, company to company,
within our industry in respect to artists, contractual relationships, marketing considerations
and product services.' With such different practices among companies, different standards
might be applied to labeling records which would only confuse the consumers and therefore
provide minimal benefit." Only three of the 62 recording companies contacted by the PTA
accepted its invitation to meet with the national organization. Id. at 90.
175. Molotsky, supra note 169, at 60, col. 1. The PMRC ascribed the PTA's failure
and its success to the positions of their husbands. Tipper Gore, wife of Tennessee Senator
Albert Gore, Jr., stated, "'Access . . . .I think that's all we have-access .... The PTA,
which has 5.6 million members, tried for a year and a half to get people to pay attention and
got nowhere . . . .Because Susan Baker and I were involved, we were able to get doors
opened. The record industry answered our phone calls.'" Id. The wives signed the initial
letter to the Recording Industry Association of America (hereinafter cited as "RIAA") over
the typed names of their husbands. Id.
176. The campaign began after several of the founding members became concerned
about the effect on their children of lyrics broadcast. After some informal discussion, the
wives called a meeting of friends from a roster culled from their Christmas card lists. Sev-
eral Senators attended the event, which featured a slide show of some of the more offensive
groups and lyrics. Galvanized, they appeared on television and granted numerous inter-
views, criticizing the music. This publicity generated contributions, the wives organized the
PMRC, and the movement snowballed into a Senate hearing. Zucchino, Big Brother Meets
Twisted Sister, ROLLING STONE, Nov. 7, 1985, at 9, 17.
177. The PMRC's first rating system proposed these standards:
X = profane or sexually explicit lyrics;
0 = reference to the occult;
V = glorification of violence; and
D/A = advocate drug or alcohol use.
Love, supra note 18, at 13. The PTA proposed that the letter "R" be used to "designate
recordings containing explicit sexual language, violence, profanity, the occult, and glorifica-
tion of drugs and alcohol." Rock Hearings, supra note 124, at 90.
178. Love, supra note 18, at 14. RIAA President Stanley Gortikov wrote that the pro-
posals "'involve complications that would make compliance impossible'" because publish-
ers control the lyrics and the performer determines the design of the album cover. Id.
179. Gortikov later conceded that he could not ignore the Washington Wives, writing
to RIAA members "'I cannot escape continuing dialogue with the PMRC group, particu-
larly in view of its Washington links."' Zucchino, supra note 176, at 64. He noted that one
of the industry's legislative priorities, protection from home taping of albums, would be
"'jeopardized'" without cooperation. Id.
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read: "Parental Guidance: Explicit Lyrics."180
The PMRC initially rejected this counter-offer. It contended
that the PG rating, determined by the record companies, did not
provide adequate warning to parents.18' As public pressure
mounted, 24 record companies, representing 80 percent of the mu-
sic industry, agreed to place the PG label on some albums. 82 This,
however, did not satisfy the PMRC and the dispute shifted to Cap-
itol Hill, where on September 19, 1985 the Senate Committee on
Commerce, Science and Transportation conducted an open hearing
on "porn rock."'8s The session enabled both sides of the contro-
versy to air their positions.
As it did throughout the campaign, the PMRC steadfastly de-
nied that its motive was anything more than informing parents
about the offensive lyrics.8 It argued that, while rock lyrics have
always been sexually-oriented and somewhat rebellious, recent
songs have simply gone too far.' As one Senator asserted,
"[s]ubleties, suggestions, and innuendo have given way to overt ex-
180. Id.
181. Tipper Gore argued that "'I don't think that addresses the problem .... We
want an industry-wide standard created by the industry. If you're going to leave it up to the
individual record companies, just leave the mess the way it is.'" Love, supra note 177, at 15.
182. Zucchino, supra note 176, at 9.
183. The PMRC denied using its spousal connections to schedule the session. Spokes-
man Tipper Gore, claiming the PMRC did not request the Senate hearing, said "'Heavens,
no . . . .That's not the way things work.'" Id. at 64. The PMRC claimed that Missouri
Republican John Danforth made the decision to conduct the hearing on his own. It con-
ceded Danforth's wife had previously discussed the problem of explicit lyrics with him. Id.
Danforth press secretary Steve Hilton, however, later admitted that "'The impetus came
from [the] PMRC, which asked for an informed presentation to the committee,' which was
granted." Id.
184. Tipper Gore, one of the founding members, testified that the PMRC does "not
want legislation to remedy this problem . . . .We would like them [the music industry] to
do this voluntarily. We propose no legislative solution whatsoever." Rock Hearings, supra
note 124, at 49. Susan Baker, another original member, commented before the meeting:
"Kids will still be able to buy albums with 'Rs' or 'Xs' or whatever they come up
with. It's like a warning label on a medicine bottle, just telling what the content
is. It's a tool. We're not saying that artists can't write this trash. I wish they
wouldn't, but we're not saying they can't. As parents, we feel we have a right to
know the content before we have a right to know the content before we purchase
something and that would be a great help to us, just like the movie ratings are a
help."
Harrington, Discord on Record Warning, Wash. Post, Aug. 29, 1985, at G1, col. 1, G14. See
also Love, supra note 177, at 14 (Tipper Gore stated, "'We're not censors. . . .We want a
tool from the industry that is peddling this stuff to children, a consumer tool with which
parents can make an informed decision on what to buy .... ')
185. Susan Baker stated, "'Parents have been yelling about rock-and-roll forever...
but they don't know that the lyrics have changed and a line has been crossed."' Pareles,
supra note 168, at C21, col. 2. Tipper Gore remarked, "'I'm a fairly with-it person, but this
stuff is curling my hair.'" Wolmuth, Parents vs. Rock, PEOPLE, Sept. 16, 1985, at 46.
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pressions and descriptions of often violent sexual acts, drug taking,
and flirtations with the occult." 186 The PMRC's evidence largely
consisted of the music itself.187
Where popular music once concerned courtship and romance,
new topics include "kinky sex, torture and even killing." 188 What
was once music that urged youthful independence, now spins tales
of sadomasochism, sexual perversion, anti-authoritarianism, and
other hedonistic behavior.189 Musicians, who once sang about chas-
ing girls, now tell of forcing women to perform oral sex at gun-
point.190 And where rock once encouraged students to celebrate
school's conclusion, its videos now illustrate "elementary school-
age children lusting for their bikini-clad teacher."' 9 PMRC
spokesmen termed the lyrics a contributing factor to the increased
societal problems of teen-age pregnancy, suicide, and rape, while
the PTA noted the messages they send children "may be danger-
ous to individuals or society. 1 92
The industry's response, featuring the testimony of several
artists, sounded the same themes it had employed throughout the
PMRC campaign. One of its primary arguments has been that the
most heavily criticized songs have received far less attention from
the record-buying public and radio stations than they have from
the PMRC.' as They noted that many of these songs are by obscure
groups, which have had only limited commercial success; 94 some
have not even been released in the United States.' 8 They con-
186. Rock Hearings, supra note 124, at 6 (statement of Sen. Paula Hawkins (R-Fla.)).
187. As one witness explained, "[t]oday's heavy metal music is categorically different
from previous forms of popular music. It contains the element of hatred, a meanness of
spirit .... I know personally of no form of popular music before which has had as one of
its central elements the element of hatred." Rock Hearings, supra note 124, at 117 (state-
ment of Dr. Joe Stuessy, University of Texas at San Antonio).
188. Raspberry, Filth on the Air, Wash. Post, June 19, 1985, at A21, col. 2.
189. Harrington, Rock With a Capital R and a PG-13, Wash. Post, Sept. 15, 1985, at
Hi.
190. Powell, What Entertainers Are Doing to Your Kids, U.S. NEWS & WORLD RE-
PORT, Oct. 28, 1985, at 46, 46.
191. Harrington, The Capitol Hill Rock War, Wash. Post, Sept. 20, 1985, at B1, col. 6,
B6.
192. Id.
193. Cocks, supra note 103, at 71. A CBS Records spokesman asserted that the
PMRC has "been documenting a minuscule number of offensive lyrics; it's the same songs
over and over again." Love, supra note 18, at 83. The PMRC concedes that only 8 percent
of all lyrics are objectionable, even by their own definition. N.Y. Times, Oct. 31, 1985, § 2, at
5, col. 1.
194. Zucchino, supra note 176, at 16. John Denver stated that the number of offensive
songs is so insignificant that "'it's not going to affect our children to a degree that we need
to be fearful of.'" Harrington, supra note 197, at B6, col. 3.
195. Cocks, supra note 103, at 71.
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tended that the ratings would only spur sales of these otherwise
ignored songs.'"e
The industry also stressed the practical problems of labeling
the approximately 25,000 songs publicly released each year.197 It
noted the inherent difficulty of rating each song on an album and
then condensing the disparate symbols into a single rating for the
entire work.'
Finally, the industry argued that the labeling efforts interfered
with its first amendment rights'"e and those of adults whose views
differ from the PMRC's. s00 The industry widely believes the label-
ing efforts to be the first step towards censorship of unpopular and
offensive lyrics by the government.2
01
The Senate hearings produced no affirmative action by the
Committee, consistent with the PMRC's assertions that its goals
were strictly informational. Nevertheless, the threat of legislation
was present. Although Committee Chairman Danforth stated that
there was "zero chance" of formal regulations,"e' other senators
were not as definitive..20  Nebraska's James Exon stated "he was
'one senator who might be interested in regulation or legislation
.. .unless the industry cleans up its act.' ",204
Throughout the hearing and immediately after, the PMRC 205
196. The music industry noted that an explicit rating would likely encourage children
to purchase the albums. As Los Angeles Mayor Tom Bradley asserted in his statement to
the Senate Committee, "Placing warning labels on record albums will do nothing but attract
children to the 'forbidden fruit,' to precisely those songs the censors have decided are objec-
tionable." Rock Hearings, supra note 124, at 153.
197. Id. at 60 (testimony of musician Frank Zappa).
198. Id.
199. Frank Zappa began his testimony by reading the first amendment. Id. at 52.
200. Id. at 97 (RIAA president Stanley Gortikov stated: "We must not trample the
rights of parents and other adults whose standards do not coincide with those of the PMRC
or any other group.").
201. Pareles, supra note 168, at C21. The American Civil Liberties Union (hereinafter
cited as "ACLU") argued that the session was an attempt "'try and create self-censorship
in the music industry.'" Id. (statement of Ira Glasser, ACLU executive director).
202. Zucchino, supra note 176, at 65.
203. Id.
204. Id. South Carolina Senator Hollings warned, "'I don't think the American public
will go along with just a nice hearing up in Washington.'" Id. Michigan Senator Don Riegle
added, "'You ought to do it [rate albums] before somebody else tries to do it for you.' " Id.
205. The PMRC did not act alone. In addition to the PTA, it received help from sev-
eral other sources, including some from within the industry itself. The National Association
of Broadcasters warned the industry to "voluntarily respond" to the efforts. Love, supra
note 18, at 15. Beach Boy Mike Love donated $5,000 to the PMRC, Motown vice president
and former recording star Smokey Robinson condemned "'porn rock,'" and Songwriters'
Guild president George David Weiss urged "the industry . .. [to] exercise 'self-restraint'
and 'tone down' lyrics for the 'moral health of children in America.'" Zucchino, supra note
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continued to reject the PG rating.20 It also expanded its efforts to
encompass rating rock concerts for content, wrapping albums with
offensive covers in brown paper, and having music videos rated
and restricted to certain viewing times.201 During this period of ad-
ditional public disagreement, several record companies defected
from the voluntary PG warning.208 Finally, the RIAA and the
PMRC-PTA announced a settlement.20 9 Record companies would
be allowed to print either the PG warning on a record or display
the potentially offensive lyrics on the album jacket. 10 Under the
compromise, the PMRC and PTA consented not to seek legislative
support or a more formal system, 1' while the record companies
retained the right to decide which albums required the labels. 12
2. LABELING THE CONSTITUTION: THE THREAT REMAINS
The accord has not lessened the controversy. Only two albums
have carried the stickers and none have contained lyric sheets.1 8
The PMRC has expressed disappointment with the number of al-
bums containing labels,214 and stated it intends to continue its ef-
forts.21 Furthermore, a poll conducted after the settlement re-
vealed that a majority of the public believes that rock records
should be rated by a system similar to motion pictures .21  Absent
some change, this environment could produce a more structured
176, at 15.
206. Id. at 9.
207. Id.
208. In early October, MCA, A&M, Geffen, Gold Mountain and I.R.S. Records all an-
nounced they would refuse to carry the warning labels. Pareles, N.Y. Times, Oct. 8, 1985, at
C10, col. 5.
209. Harrington, Accord on Lyrics Labeling, Nov. 2, 1985, at H1, col. 1.
210. The stickers would be placed on albums containing lyrics involving sex, violence
or substance abuse. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. An industry newsletter reported that the Sigue Sigue Sputnik album "Flaunt It"
became the "first big deal rock act to allow its LP to be released" with the warning sticker.
ROCK & ROLL CONFIDErIAL, Sept. 1986, at 3. The albums with warning stickers "have been
pretty much tongue in cheek." Harrington, A Porn Lyric Survey, Wash. Post, Jan. 22, 1986,
at C7, col. 4.
214. ROCK & ROLL CONFIDENTIAL, Aug. 1986, at 2. The PMRC has collected informa-
tion on new albums, while expressing its unhappiness that no records have been labeled.
Dirty Work, ROCK & ROLL CONFIDENTIAL, May 1986, at 2.
215. ROCK & ROLL CONFIDENTIAL, Aug. 1986, at 2.
216. The poll reported that 75 percent of adults supported a ratings system, while 80
percent favored printing lyrics on the albums. Seventy-eight percent believe, however, that
"the record industry should take steps to regulate itself." DeCurtis, ROLLING STONE, Aug.
28, 1986, at 26. The poll was conducted by Media General/Associated Press. Harrington,
supra note 213, at C7, col. 4.
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rating system similar to the Motion Picture of America ("MPAA")
Code.217  Such an arrangement implicates first amendment
concerns.
a. Improperly Discouraging Protected Speech
The initial first amendment problem is that the likely effect of
any rating or labeling system would be to improperly restrict the
public's access to constitutionally protected material. The movie
industry's involvement with film ratings and the publishing indus-
try's recent experience with pornography watchdogs illustrate the
chilling effects of these systems.
When a motion picture is assigned an "X" rating under the
MPAA code, the general public perception is that the picture is
obscene.2 s This characterization causes several injurious conse-
quences. First, theater owners who display X-rated films become
the target of community disapprobation.1 9 This hostility may de-
crease future attendance because patrons might even boycott fu-
ture showings of films not rated "X", believing that theater to be
an X-rated establishment. Second, many newspapers will not print
advertisements for these films or even review them, thereby ren-
dering the films commercially untenable.220 Finally, network and
pay television, which are lucrative sources of revenue for producers
and studios, often refuse to replay these movies.22  Therefore, the
"X" rating reduces the marketability of the films. These economic
concerns discourage the motion picture industry from making
movies which could be rated "X"-even if the movies are not ob-
scene under the appropriate Supreme Court standards.222 Thus,
217. A more formal rating system would likely take one of two forms. The first would
be a government-created body to establish the standards for the records. The other would
be a voluntary committee composed of community members, rock industry representatives
and possibly members of the PMRC or a similar organization that would determine the
labels. The following discussion assumes that the ratings are binding on the companies and
the artists, most likely through contractual obligations.
218. Friedman, The Motion Picture Rating System of 1968: A Constitutional Analy-
si8 of Self-Regulation By the Film Industry, 73 COLUM. L. Ray. 185, 202 (1973). This per-
ception occurs regardless of the movie's merit or social value. Id.
219. Id. at 205.
220. One major Hollywood studio recently altered the name of a movie because televi-
sion stations and newspapers would not run its advertisements due to the title's sexual tone.
The producers stated they thought that the "title would have stopped some people from
seeing (the movie]." Harmetz, Film 'Sexual Perversity' is Getting a New Name, N.Y.
Times, Apr. 16, 1986, at C19, col. 5. The producers felt that the movie would be successful
regardless of the title, so they acceded to the change in name.
221. Friedman, supra note 218, at 202-03.
222. As a film critic noted, "[n]obody wants an X, since it puts the movie off limits to
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the freedom of speech of the industry's members is effectively
restricted.
The publishing industry has also experienced the effect of
having material labeled as pornographic. In May 1984, President
Ronald Reagan called for the creation of a commission to examine
the effects of pornography on American society.223 This resulted in
the Attorney General's Commission on Pornography. Before com-
pleting its final report, the Attorney General's Commission on Por-
nography contacted several large companies by letter asserting
that because these companies sold Penthouse, Playboy and similar
magazines, they were "involved in the 'sale and distribution of por-
nography.' "1224 These letters charged that testimony before the
Commission linked the targeted companies to pornography. The
letters also offered the companies an opportunity to rebut the
charges.225
Several of the targeted companies responded by discontinuing
the sale of magazines. The New York Times reported that "[mreore
than 8,000 convenience stores around the country have removed
'adult' magazines from their shelves since the beginning of
[1986]. ''22 The reasons given for the removal of the magazines
were the findings of the Attorney General's Commission on Por-
nography as well as changing mores.22 7 Widespread boycotts and
a very large part of the moviegoing market. Nor is a G popular; teen-agers may interpret it
as a signal that the movie is a milk-and-water concoction, suitable only for infants." Good-
man, Grading Hollywood's Ratings System, N.Y. Times, July 27, 1986, at H19, col. 1.
223. President's Remarks on Signing H.R. 3635 Into Law, 20 WEEKLY CoMP. PREs.
Doc. 743 (May 21, 1984).
224. Wald, 'Adult' Magazines Lose Sales as 8,000 Stores Forbid Them, N.Y. Times,
June 16, 1986, at Al, col. 5. The targeted companies included 7-Eleven convenience stores,
Dart Drug, K-mart and Rite Aid. Id. at A14, col. 1.
225. N.Y. Times, May 20, 1986, at A24, col. 1. Although the letter did not identify
whose testimony was taken, the testimony reportedly consisted solely of the Rev. Donald
Wildmon's statements to the Commission. Wildmon is executive director of the National
Federation of Decency, a group which "holds that birth control, sex education, nudity and
sex between consenting adults are equally indefensible." Green, The Shame of America,
PEOPLE, June 30, 1986, at 32. The letter also warned that "'[flailure to respond [to the
letter] will necessarily be accepted as an indication of no objection'" to the charges. N.Y.
Times, supra, at A24, col. 1.
226. Wald, supra note 224, at Al, col. 1. Wildmon's group estimated that 20,000 out-
lets ceased selling such materials since 1983. Others have estimated that the total is 16,000
stores. Blodgett, Porno Blacklist? A.B.A. J., July, 1986, at 28.
227. See Wald, supra note 224, at Al, col. 1. A 7-Eleven spokesman stated, "[the
Commission's] letter was secondary to the decision" claiming instead that "'[a] recent sur-
vey showed a change in customer attitude to those magazines.'" Green, supra note 225, at
32. To the contrary, another chain conducted its own survey and found that most of its
customers had no objection to the chain's sale of the magazines. Wald, supra note 224, at
A14, col. 4.
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picketing have accompanied the Commission's letters,28 providing
additional pressures on those retailers to cease sales. This pressure
has caused several of the magazines to seek redress in the courts.22 9
The seeds of this same cycle can be observed in the record
industry, even though a formal rating system has yet to be estab-
lished. The Washington Post reported that "some mall record
stores have already been informed that if they carry records with
an 'explicit' sticker warning, their leases may be canceled. '230 Rec-
ord company executives report that some retailers have refused to
stock records with the PG labels because of pressure from various
interest groups, particularly religious organizations. 21 Other retail-
ers have returned albums with questionable covers, anticipating
the wrath of local groups.232 As one critic of labeling noted, "[o]ne
can easily imagine how energetic picketing by right-wing, 'family
value' groups outside record stores could swiftly reduce the musical
diet of the young . . . and place most of America's 20th Century
musical heritage under plain wrapper. 2' 3 The proposed labels ar-
guably would provide these interested groups with an effective
mechanism to eliminate records which do not meet with the
groups' approval. 234
Still another retailer cited a changing national mood for its decision to stop selling the
material: "'We believe the social mores in the communities in which we do business have
evolved from the free thinking 1970's to a social structure with greater respect for funda-
mental traditions and values.'" Wash. Post, Feb. 22, 1986, at B8, col. 1.
228. Stengel, Sex Busters, TIME, July 21, 1986, at 18.
229. Citing the effect of the stores' decisions, Penthouse and Playboy have brought
suit to prevent the Commission from "issuing a 'blacklist' of 'identified distributors of por-
nography.'" Blodgett, supra note 226, at 28. See Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Meese, 639 F.
Supp. 581 (D.D.C. 1986) (granting a preliminary injunction enjoining the Commission from
printing the names of the distributors of the alleged pornography in the Commission's final
report. See also Penthouse Int'l Ltd. v. Meese, No. 86-1515 (D.D.C. filed May 21, 1986).
230. Harrington, Rock With a Capital R and a PG-13, Wash. Post, Sept. 15, 1985, at
HI, col. 2.
231. Wash. Post, Oct. 3, 1985, at D1, col. 1.
232. Cockburn, Mrs. Grundys Give Record Ratings A Spin, Wall St. J., Aug. 22, 1983,
at 23, col. 3.
233. Id. An executive of a large retail firm reported that:
[i]f an "X" rating were established for records, his stores would not carry them.
"We have some real concerns about carrying "R" records as well. We're mall-
oriented retailers, and what happens if these groups start picketing our stores,
and mall developers tell us we cannot carry certain records?"
N.Y. Times, Sept. 18, 1985, at C21, col. 1.
234. "The establishment of a rating system, voluntary or otherwise opens the door to
an endless parade of moral quality control programs based on things certain Christians do
not like." Rock Hearings, supra note 124, at 54 (testimony of musical artist Frank Zappa).
Influence of these groups is particularly widespread. There is no evidence to support the
theory that the American public supports these efforts. To the contrary, voters in Maine
rejected a proposal that would have criminalized the sale of pornography by more than a
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These developments, coupled with the movie and publishing
industries' experiences, forecast that the impact of record ratings
may extend beyond simply informing parents about the nature of
the songs. " The real effect might be to discourage vendors from
stocking certain records. Such discouragement would frustrate the
creation of certain music just because a segment of society disliked
it.
If a derogatory label is attached to an author's work, he will be
unable to sell his work in the marketplace"' and will thus be en-
couraged to censor himself. The disparagement of a rating system
provides a strong incentive to not write lyrics that may invite a
negative label, even though the lyrics would not be obscene. If rec-
ord stores respond to a ratings system as retail outlets have to the
national pornography panel, rock artists will find their access to
the public greatly restricted.237 This would occur even though no
court has determined that the lyrics lack first amendment
protection.
The deterrent effect of a warning label can be viewed as vio-
lating the Constitution.2 38 Although the labeled music is not di-
rectly prohibited, a rating system constitutes an informal abridge-
ment of expression that cannot withstand first amendment
scrutiny.23 9 Restrictions need not be directly applied to offend the
two to one margin. N.Y. Times, June 12, 1986, at A27, col. 1.
235. It has been noted that movie ratings are not informative and "merely impart a
general feeling about a rated film." Note, Private Ratings of Motion Pictures as a Basis for
State Regulation, 59 GEo. L.J. 1205, 1216 (1971). It may be inferred from this that labels
could never be informational, unless they provide greater detail about the lyrical content of
the song.
236. It is not enough to argue that an author has lost his constitutional freedom of
speech just because the lyrics of his songs have been found to be obscene by some people.
Constitutional protection is lost only when the material is found to be obscene under the
Supreme Court's standards. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973) (establishing defini-
tion for obscenity); see also Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965) (adopting procedural
safeguards for obscenity determination). If the rating system does not meet the required
standards and safeguards then the affected speech should be constitutionally protected.
237. For example, one record company has cited "the possibility of difficulties at the
retail level to pressure" an artist into "dropping one song and altering the lyrics of another."
DeCurtis, Record Companies Finesse PMRC, ROLLING STONE, May 18, 1986, at 16. See also
Krauthammer, X Ratings for Rock? Wash. Post, Sept. 20, 1985, at A27, col. 1.
238. Not only does a warning label violate the speaker's rights under the Constitution,
it also prevents willing listeners from exercising their constitutional right to receive informa-
tion. The Supreme Court has held that the public has a "right to receive information and
ideas, regardless of their social worth." Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1968) (citation
omitted); see also Virginia Pharmacy Board v. Virginia Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 756
(1976) (recipients of information possess first amendment protection); Griswold v. Connecti-
cut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945).
239. First amendment freedoms "are protected not only against heavy-handed frontal
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Constitution.24 Accordingly, the Supreme Court held as unconsti-
tutional government actions that discourage, 24 1 restrict, 12 in-
hibit, ,4 or limit24 4 free speech as impinging first amendment free-
doms. This doctrine also applies to regulations that provide a
"basic incentive"'24" not to speak. A state cannot "increase the
cost" of distributing protected speech by making it difficult for the
speaker by encouraging suppression of his speech.24 1 It is immate-
rial that the government did not intend to stifle free expression.2 4
Although the state purports to act with the lawful purpose of pro-
viding information to parents, incidental infringements on first
amendment rights that occur "as an unintended but direct result
of the government's conduct," as opposed to direct content-based
regulations, remain unconstitutional.24
Of course, not all abridgements of speech are unconstitutional.
But if expressions are not obscene, then a state may regulate them
only if necessary to serve a compelling state interest and if the reg-
attack, but also from being stifled by more subtle governmental interference." Bates v. City
of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 523 (1960) (citations omitted).
240. Restrictions are not made less offensive because they are indirectly applied. The
Supreme Court stated that "[wle are not the first court to look through forms to the sub-
stance and recognize that informal censorship may sufficiently inhibit the circulation of
publications to warrant injunctive relief." Bantam Books v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 67 (1963)
(footnote omitted); see also Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. Dallas, 390 U.S. 676, 688 (1968) (Inva-
sions of first amendment freedoms "are not rendered less objectionable because the regula-
tion of expression is one of classification, rather than direct suppression."); Penthouse Int'l,
Ltd. v. McAuliffe, 610 F.2d 1353, 1360 (5th Cir. 1980) ("Courts must look through the form
to the substance when examining whether a system of informal prior restraint has been
created.") (citations omitted), cert. dismissed, 447 U.S. 931 (1980); Greenberg v. Bolger, 497
F. Supp. 756, 775 (E.D.N.Y. 1980) (citation omitted) ("It does not matter whether the im-
pediment to free speech works its evil overtly or covertly.").
241. American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 402 (1950) ("Under
some circumstances, indirect 'discouragements' undoubtedly have the same coercive effect
upon the exercise of First Amendment rights as imprisonment, fines, injunctions or taxes.").
242. Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp., 463 U.S. 60 (1983).
243. Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301, 309 (1965) (Brennan, J., concurring)
("inhibition as well as prohibition against the exercise of precious First Amendment rights is
a power denied to government").
244. Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Service Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530 (1980).
245. Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 41 (Harlan, J., concurring) (1968).
246. Cf. Erznoznik, 422 U.S. at 211 n.7 (discussing how an ordinance effectively in-
creased the cost of showing films containing nudity).
247. NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 461 (1958).
248. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 65 (1976) (per curiam). See also Spencer v.
Herdesty, 571 F. Supp. 444, 451 (S.D. Ohio 1983) ("It is well-established however, that en-
croachments on First Amendment rights that arise 'not through direct Government action,
but indirectly are an unintended but inevitable result of the Government's conduct' are just
as constitutionally infirm as overt content-based discrimination.") (quoting Buckley, 424
U.S. at 65).
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ulations are "narrowly tailored to achieve that end. '2 49 The reasons
offered in support of the enactment of regulations affecting rock
music-the offensiveness of the lyrics, their threat to the moral
character of American youth and their lack of redeeming
value25°-cannot serve as the requisite state interest sufficient to
justify abridging free speech.-5" An "undifferentiated fear or appre-
hension of disturbance is not enough to overcome the right to free-
dom of expression. 2 52
In Bantam Books v. Sullivan,53 the Supreme Court held that
a Rhode Island state commission's mailing of letters to retailers
describing certain publications as "objectionable" was unconstitu-
tional.2 54 The Court found this activity to constitute a "scheme of
state censorship effectuated by extralegal sanctions" 25 because the
commission had "deliberately set about to achieve the suppres-
sion" of constitutionally protected materials.256 For purposes of
constitutional analysis, the activities of the Rhode Island commis-
sion are indistinguishable from those of a ratings board constituted
to label rock records.2 57
b. Ratings and the Overbreadth Doctrine
The ratings systems face a second constitutional barrier in the
overbreadth doctrine. Under the overbreadth doctrine, legislation
will be declared void if its permissible regulation of speech also
invades expression protected by the first amendment.25  A court
249. Wildomon, 454 U.S. at 27.
250. See supra notes 185-92 and accompanying text.
251. See infra notes 331-34 and accompanying text.
252. Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 508
(1969).
253. 372 U.S. 58 (1963).
254. Id. at 62. See also Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. Dallas, 390 U.S. 676 (1968) (classifi-
cation scheme of suitable and not suitable held unconstitutional).
255. Bantam Books, 372 U.S. at 72.
256. Id. at 67.
257. One court recently employed similar reasoning to hold that a statute, which pro-
vided for the labeling of certain foreign films as "political" propaganda, violated the consti-
tution. Keene v. Meese, 619 F. Supp. 1111, 1124 (E.D. Cal. 1985), prob. juris. noted, 106 S.
Ct. 1632 (1986). The plaintiff alleged that the application of the label "so denigrates the
materials that they are made unavailable to [him]." Keene, 619 F. Supp. at 1114. Finding
that the labeling infringed on the plaintiff's first amendment rights notwithstanding that
the government action was not overt, the court held that an abridgement occurs whenever
there is a "substantial interference with speech, regardless of the modus operandi." Id. at
1124 (emphasis in original). But cf. Block v. Smith, 583 F. Supp. 1288 (D.D.C. 1984), affd
793 F.2d 1303 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (holding that similarly situated plaintiffs lacked standing to
assert first amendment claim).
258. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940).
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analyzing an overbreadth challenge to a music rating system would
likely examine whether the regulations sweep beyond the permissi-
ble restraints on obscenity, thereby impinging on non-obscene mu-
sical expression.25 '
Regardless of the standards created by a ratings board at-
tempting to prevent obscene lyrics, any regulation is likely to in-
clude protected speech within its ambit. Thus, such regulations
raise two distinct overbreadth problems. First, the interpretation
of rock music, more so than motion pictures, is a highly subjective
process. As stated in the New York Times, "song lyrics don't nec-
essarily deliver the same message to everyone who hears them."
2 60
Because the commercial radio format encourages shorter songs,
most songwriters limit their number of written words, which re-
sults in ambiguous meanings.'
A ratings board, however, will make its own interpretations in
assigning a label to an album. The PMRC's campaign has already
illustrated the difficulty in developing a single interpretation of
lyrics for many rock songs. For example, the PMRC asserted that
Twisted Sister's "Under the Blade" concerned violent perversions.
The song's author, however, contended it involved a friend's fear of
surgery:262 "'As the creator . . . I can state categorically that the
only sadomasochism, bondage, and rape in this song is in the mind
of Ms. Gore.' ,2,s Although a song about the fear of surgery might
not implicate constitutional concern,2" ' had the PMRC's interpre-
tation been adopted by the ratings board, the song would have re-
ceived an X rating, subjecting it to the informal censorship accom-
panying that label. This would seem to be the result even though
the songs were not held to be obscene by any court.265
259. Erznoznik v. Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 208 (1975). An individual has standing to
challenge the entire statute even if engaged only in non-protected speech. Village of
Schaumberg v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 444 U.S. 620, 633-34 (1980).
260. Pareles, supra note 122, at 5, col. 1.
261. Id.
262. Zucchino, supra note 176, at 66, col. 3.
263. USA Today, Oct. 11, 1985, at 10A, col. 1 (quoting the testimony of Dee Snider,
the song's author, before Congress).
264. Country musician John Denver endured a similar experience. His song "Rocky
Mountain High" was banned by many radio stations who interpreted it as encouraging drug
use. Yet, as Denver told the Senate, this was a "clear case of misinterpretation." Rock Hear-
ings, supra note 124, at 65. He explained that the lyrics concerned the "elation, celebration
of life, or the joy in living that one feels" while experiencing nature. Id.
265. See Pareles, supra note 122, at 5, col. 2 (questioning whether the Jacksons' "Tor-
ture" is "a brief for sadomasochism or . . . a metaphor for unrequited love?"); see also
Cocks, supra note 103, at 71, col. 2 (noting different interpretations of "Looking Out My
Back Door" by Creedence Clearwater Revival).
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The proposed rating system for rock music employs terms that
rely exclusively on the subjective beliefs of a few about the mean-
ing of the rated lyrics. This proposed rating invariably assigns the
most explicit interpretation possibles" because of the traditional
antipathy towards rock music. 67 The result of this overly broad
interpretation is to deter musicians from writing songs that are not
legally obscene, yet are likely to be labeled as such. Protected
speech will be infringed-the precise result the overbreadth doc-
trine was intended to prevent.68 The possibility of this overly
broad misinterpretation is too great to be tolerated under the first
amendment.
A second issue under the overbreadth doctrine arises from the
nature of the industry itself. The rock songs assailed by the PMRC
are usually distributed to the public packaged in albums, accompa-
nied by other music whose lyrics often concern completely diver-
gent subjects. While one song on an album might arguably be la-
beled as obscene, the remainder of that record might be protected
speech and as such would be an improper subject for regulation.
The PMRC, however, proposes to rate the entire album. In
doing so, the label's stigma attaches to the entire album, effectively
preventing the distribution of the non-obscene protected songs.""
Thus, through their regulation of unprotected speech, states trans-
gress the first amendment liberties of artists to disseminate non-
obscene music. This violates the overbreadth doctrine.2 0 The Su-
preme Court has plainly refused to allow states to regulate unpro-
tected speech through methods "which sweep unnecessarily
266. The experience of Frank Zappa in 1967 is illustrative. A record company re-
worded his song entitled "Let's Make the Water Turn Black," eliminating these lyrics:
"'[a~nd I still remember mama with her apron and pad / Feeding all the boys at Ed's
cafe.'" As Zappa stated, "'[a] person at the record company was convinced that the pad in
question was a sanitary napkin. That's the kind of thing that you can be subjected to when
you let somebody decide what is dirty, what is occult, what is violent and the rest.'"
Wolmuth, supra note 185, at 50.
267. As one classical music critic noted, in urging his readers to listen to rock artists
such as Stevie Wonder, Linda Ronstadt and Little Richard, "[ilf the music at first seems
vulgar to the touch, remember that this is a vulgarity measured against standards of taste
borrowed from someone else." Holland, Just How Much Reality Can Music Bear?, N.Y.
Times, Apr. 17, 1986 at C25, col. 2.
268. The Supreme Court stated that "where statutes have an overbroad sweep ...
'the hazard of loss or substantial impairment of those precious rights may be critical'...
since those covered by the statute are bound to limit their behavior to that which is unques-
tionably safe." Keyishiam v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 609 (1967).
269. See supra notes 218-257 and accompanying text (noting violation of first
amendment).
270. Simply identifying one song on an album as obscene does not alleviate the prob-
lem because the label's effect is the same-store owners will still not carry the album.
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broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms. 271
c. Private Labels as State Action
The preceding discussion assumes governmental involvement
with the ratings board. 2  If the industry and consumer groups,
however, agreed to establish a committee for this purpose, there
would be no violation of amendment rights unless the labeling sys-
tem could be considered a state action because the Constitution
does not apply to purely private conduct.2 78 The state action re-
quirement for a private system, however, is satisfied under tradi-
tional constitutional analysis.2 4
Classification of entertainment into acceptable and unsuitable
categories has traditionally been a government function.2 7 5 The
state has long considered shielding children from dangerous mater-
ials its duty,27 ' and has long sought to suppress obscene entertain-
ment even from adults.2" A private ratings system, by assigning
labels to records after judging their content, assumes the responsi-
bility for determining what songs should be available for purchase
by children. The ratings board, however, acts as an agent of the
government; its decisions therefore constitute state action under
the public function doctrine.278
271. Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. at 250. See also United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171,
187 (1983) ("[A] statute which sweeps within its ambit a broad range of expression pro-
tected by the first amendment should be struck down on its face.").
272. Were the Senate hearing to ripen into a full-scale investigation of rock lyrics, it
would provide a basis for objection under the Constitution, even in the absence of legisla-
tion. As the Court held in Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 197 (1957),
[cIlearly, an investigation is subject to the command that the Congress shall
make no law abridging freedom of speech .... While it is true that there is no
statute to be reviewed, and that an investigation is not a law, nevertheless an
investigation is part of lawmaking. It is justified solely as an adjunct to the legis-
lative process. The First Amendment may be invoked against infringement of
the protected freedoms by law or by lawmaking.
273. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
274. Although the motion picture industry's system has not yet been held unconstitu-
tional, several commentators have concluded it is. See e.g., Friedman, supra note 218, at
185; Note, supra note 235, at 1205.
275. See Friedman, supra note 218, at 225 (noting that film classification has long
been province of government).
276. The Supreme Court recognizes that the state possesses a responsibility, indepen-
dent of parents, to ensure that harmful materials are kept from children's reach. Prince, 321
U.S. at 169-70.
277. See supra note 49.
278. The public function doctrine recognizes that private actors can often assume the
mantle of government officials and impinge on individual liberties by engaging in activities
traditionally performed by government. See Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946) (com-
pany town as state actor); Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953) (pre-primary elections by
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In addition, 7 e the government has encouraged the industry
and consumers to create a private rating system. 28 0 The Supreme
Court has held that similar encouragement can taint the private
organization's operation with state action.28' Finally, the state ben-
efits from the private enforcement of a labeling system;28 2 such
symbiosis between the government and the private entity may also
constitute state action.283 Therefore, because a ratings board would
be equivalent to a "mini-sovereign," its actions are "subject to the
strictures" of the first amendment.284
Regardless of the outcome of this state action analysis, the
government's ability to employ a private ratings system would be
county political organization as state actor); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944) (control
over primary elections by political party as state actor).
279. Although recent court decisions have narrowed the breadth of the public forum
doctrine, they do not alter this conclusion. The Burger Court, in reducing the scope of the
state action doctrine, indicated that two new tests may now be required. The first is that the
traditional state function must have been exclusively the government's. See Flagg Brothers,
Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978) (warehousing not exclusive state function); Jackson v.
Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974) (utility not exclusive state function). This,
however, does not exempt a private music ratings board from being a state actor. With the
exception of some relatively informal internal industry standards, entertainment, when reg-
ulated, has almost always been regulated by the state.
Second, the Burger Court appears to require some statutory or constitutional provision
that mandates the private action. See Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991 (1982) (nursing homes
not public function); Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830 (1981) (private school not public
function). This requirement is met by the clear warnings the federal government has pro-
vided the industry about the need for self-regulation as a means to avoid government action.
See supra notes 203-04 and accompanying text. But for the threat of government interfer-
ence, it is unlikely the industry would have acted.
280. The Senate hearing is illustrative. Although conceding that it could not constitu-
tionally regulate the lyrics, government officials stated that they would like to see regulation
enacted by the industry. Cocks, supra note 103, at 70-71. See also supra notes 202-04. Even
President Reagan has spoken against the lyrics, thereby subtly inviting regulation: "I don't
believe that our Founding Fathers ever intended . . . the right of pornographers [to] take
precedence over the rights of parents, and the violent and malevolent to be given free rein
to prey upon our children." USA Today, Oct. 11, 1985, at 10A, col. 1.
281. In Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961), the Court found
state action in the refusal of a restaurant located in a public building to serve minorities
because it benefited the state. The government overtly encouraged such a system. See supra
note 280 and accompanying text.
282. The primary benefit is the performance of a state function that would be compli-
cated, expensive, time consuming, and controversial. By having industry and consumers face
these hurdles, the government is able to accomplish its goal of regulating children's access to
offensive rock records at minimal expense.
283. Any additional requirements created by the Court's decision in Lugar v. Edmon-
son Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922 (1982), would not be a bar to a finding of state action. In Lugar,
the Court held that the private actor must perform his duty under a right or privilege cre-
ated by the state to be considered a state action.
284. Friedman, supra note 218, at 239.
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limited.2" A state could not use the labels to ban the lyrics. The
courts have struck down attempts to enact the motion picture in-
dustry rating symbols into law as a basis for regulating films.2 s5
Several decisions found such regulations unconstitutional as ap-
plied because they failed to employ the Miller obscenity test 87 or
utilized vague and unascertainable standards.28 A record labeling
system would offend the same constitutional principles.
B. Banning the Sale of Rock Lyrics
For some communities and interest groups, simply rating the
albums is insufficient. They have advocated legislation that would
ban the sale of obscene records to minors. At least twelve states
have already introduced bills to this effect 8 ' and others will proba-
bly follow suit.29 0 Legislative intervention is particularly likely be-
cause of the PMRC's success in focusing national attention on the
damages of "porn rock. ' 29 1 Unless a music industry-PMRC com-
promise alleviates this newly fostered national concern over ex-
plicit lyrics, the public may demand more stringent statutory rem-
edies, such as a complete prohibition on the sale of records. Any
such solutions, which would most likely be directed at obscene mu-
sic, must satisfy the Supreme Court's requirements for the restric-
285. Note, Film Is a Four Letter Word, 5 MEM. ST. U.L. REv. 41, 47 (1974).
286. Friedman, supra note 218, at 230.
287. See Swope v. Lubbers, 560 F. Supp. 1328, 1334 (W.D. Mich. 1983) ("lIt is well-
established that the Motion Picture ratings may not be used as a standard for determina-
tion of constitutional status."); Engdahl v. City of Kenosha, Wisc., 317 F. Supp. 1133, 1136
(E.D. Wisc. 1970) (procedures do not meet the constitutional requirements of government
regulation of obscenity).
288. Motion Picture Ass'n of America v. Specter, 315 F. Supp. 824, 826 (E.D. Pa.
1970).
289. According to one survey, Alabama, Arizona, Florida, Hawaii, Maine, Massachu-
setts, New Jersey, New York, South Carolina, South Dakota, West Virginia, and Wisconsin
are all considering legislation to restrict the sale of rock music. Seligman, ROLLING STONE,
June 19, 1986, at 29. In Maryland, the House of Delegates approved such legislation, but the
Senate's Judicial Proceedings Committee rejected the legislation. Its sponsor has promised
to reintroduce the measure. "We need a statement and we'll be making that statement over
and over again until somebody in a responsible position says, 'It's enough. We've got to do
something to pull back,'" Maryland Delegate Judith Toth asserted. "What you're seeing is
the beginning of a movement, not the end." Id.
290. Toth predicted that "at least ten, fifteen states" will have approved such legisla-
tion by next year. Id.
291. As Zappa asserted, the Senate hearing was "like mass advertising to make it hap-
pen on the state level." ROLLING STONE, June 19, 1986, at 19. The issue is alluring to politi-
cians as well. Colorado Senator William Armstrong reported that if he runs for President in
1988 he will make rock lyrics a campaign issue because of its "aberrant sex practices." RocK
AND ROLL CONFIDENTAL, June 1986, at 3.
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tion of this category of speech.2"'
1. REGULATIONS AIMED AT OBSCENE SONGS
a. Are They Really Obscene: Obscenity for Adult Purposes
As protected expression, music can be banned if it is adjudged
obscene or belongs to another class of unprotected speech.293 Stat-
utes that purport to regulate obscene materials, however, "must be
carefully limited" because they implicate free speech concerns29
and will fail unless they comply with the Supreme Court's defini-
tion of obscenity outlined in Miller.9 5
Although it would be impossible to evaluate many of the songs
specifically, a general review demonstrates that few rock lyrics
would be adjudged obscene under Miller, even though many of
them frankly discuss sexual relations.296 Popular music is by its
very nature strongly tinged with sexuality:
[Ilt is sex that is the basic high for rock 'n' roll . . . with its
irreducibly emphatic backbeat, rock 'n' roll is fundamentally
physical music, music that makes you move, sway, gyrate, hump,
dance . . . Rock 'n' roll is drenched with sex. Rock 'n' roll-the
name means it; even the 'n' means it: unh! Rock 'n' Roll is the
sexual revolution.2 79
But this alone does not make the lyrics obscene.
In Miller, the Supreme Court established a three-part stan-
dard that must be satisfied before material can be considered le-
gally obscene. To be considered obscene, a work must appeal to the
"prurient interest," as determined by the "average person, apply-
ing contemporary community standards;" depict "in a patently of-
fensive way, sexual conduct;" and "taken as a whole, lack[] serious
literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.929 8
Under this standard, few rock lyrics can be considered ob-
scene, because they merely portray sex, and do not "excite lustful
thoughts"29' or deal with sex in a "shameful or morbid" manner,
292. The same overbreadth problems previously discussed, concerning a ratings sys-
tem, are relevant here. See supra notes 258-70 and accompanying text.
293. See supra notes 53-76 and accompanying text.
294. Miller, 413 U.S. at 23-24.
295. See supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text.
296. R. DUNCAN, supra note 2, at 83-84 (discussing sexual content of music).
297. Id.
298. Miller, 413 U.S. at 24.
299. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 487 n.20 (1957) (quoting WESTsER's NEW
INTERNATIONAL DICTONARY (unabridged, 2d ed. 1949)).
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employing particularly graphic language, which is required under
Miller.300
Most of the lyrics the PMRC has called obscene involve short
statements that sexual activities are occurring, rather than a lurid
description of the act itself.30' These lyrics do little more than con-
cern a sexual topic. Rock songs generally offer the listener only
short snippets of sex, simply employing its terminology, but with-
out merging the language into a graphic description of hardcore
sexual activity. The difference is constitutionally significant. The
mere representation of sexual activitys°2 or the use of profanes s
and vulgar 0 4 language does not by itself constitute obscenity. The
Supreme Court's test mandates something more; cases finding ma-
terial obscene since Miller have required a finding of explicit,
hardcore sexual activity containing insignificant non-erotic con-
tent. 0 5 Rock songs do not approach this level of specificity. They
merely depict sexual activity, which alone does not constitute ob-
scenity.306 Rock songs are similar to "displays [of] the nude human
figure. '[N]udity alone' does not place otherwise protected material
outside the mantle of the first amendment."'3 0' Prince's songs may
be erotic, but that "does not lessen the protection to which their
dissemination is entitled."308
b. Regulating Minors' Access to Obscenity
The Miller test would, however, have only limited application
if the states banned the distribution of obscene recordings only to
300. Id., (quoting A.L.I. MODEL PENAL CODE, § 207.10(2) (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1957)).
301. Prince's "Darling Nikki" is illustrative. It merely states that a woman was mas-
turbating. It does not describe the act or offer any graphic explanation. This does not meet
the Miller test for obscenity, yet the PMRC has saved its greatest condemnation for the
song. Many of the other examples cited by the PMRC are similar. See supra note 125.
302. J-R Distributors, Inc. v. Eikenberry, 725 F.2d 482, 490-92 (9th Cir. 1984) rev'd on
other grounds, 105 S. Ct. 2794 (1985).
303. Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105 (1973). See also State v. Yoakum, 30 Wash. App.
874, 876. 638 P.2d 1264, 1265 (1982) (mere vulgarity not unprotected).
304. Manual Enter. v. Day, 370 U.S. 478, 490 (1962) ("The most that can be said of
them is that they are dismally unpleasant, uncouth and tawdry. But this is not enough to
make them obscene."); Huffman v. United States, 470 F.2d 386, 396 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (first
amendment "extends to trash, if it stops short of obscenity").
305. See Annotation, Modern Concept of Obscenity, 5 ALR 3d 1158.
306. See Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153 (1974) (obscenity ruling overturned because
depicts only naked woman).
307. Schad, 452 U.S. at 66; Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. at 161.
308. Wall Distrib., Inc. v. The City of Newport News, Va., 782 F.2d 1165, 1168 (4th
Cir. 1986); Fantasy Book Shop v. City of Boston, 652 F.2d 1115, 1126 (1st Cir. 1981) ("sexu-
ally explicit, but non-obscene materials, however distasteful, are entitled to no less protec-
tion than other forms of expression").
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children.30 9 The Supreme Court ruled in Ginsberg v. New York
that the obscenity standard can vary with age;s states therefore
have broad authority " ' to bar minors from sexually-oriented
materials which might not be obscene for adults. i1
The state's power, however, is not unlimited. First, Ginsberg
does not permit the proscription of all sexually-oriented material
from children. Because minors possess a "significant measure" of
first amendment protection, a state may not shield them from ob-
taining expressions that merely concern sexual topics."' 3 "Rather,
to be obscene 'such expression must be, in some significant way,
erotic.' "314 The statute upheld in Ginsberg contained the patently
offensive test for determining whether the materials were ob-
scene,31 5 suggesting that despite the state's definitional leeway, it
may not deviate completely from the traditional standards for
judging obscenity.3 16
Thus, rock records will have to do more than merely employ
racy words or state sexual activities; they must contain some
erotic, if not hardcore, sexual material before they can be prohib-
ited.3 17 Those seeking to regulate "porn rock" must demonstrate
such extreme subject matter because lyrics "cannot be suppressed
solely to protect the young from ideas or images that a legislative
body thinks unsuitable for them."3 18 Without such a showing, reg-
309. The Maryland statute would have made it a misdemeanor to sell or distribute
obscene music materials to anyone under 18. Harrington, X-Rated Lyrics Bill on Maryland
Slate, Wash. Post, Feb. 8, 1986, at Cl, col. 6.
310. Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
311. See e.g., Krislov, From Ginzberg to Ginsberg; The Unhurried Children's Hour in
Obscenity Litigation, 1968 Sue. CT. REv. 153 (discussing contents of Ginsberg decision).
312. In Ginsberg, the Court upheld a statute that defined obscenity in terms of pruri-
ent appeal to minors. 390 U.S. at 631-33.
313. Erznoznik, 422 U.S. at 212-13. As the Seventh Circuit stated,
children do not stand outside the protections of the Constitution .... Although
society is free to express its special concern for its children in a variety of regula-
tory schemes, it may not excise a child's constitutional prerogatives under the
guise of protecting his interest. . . . [A] child's freedom of speech is too impor-
tant to be overridden by an ordinance expressing the community's view of what
it considers as material harmful to its youth.
Cinecom Theatres Midwest St., Inc. v. City of Fort Wayne, 473 F.2d 1297, 1302 (7th Cir.
1973).
314. Erznoznik, 422 U.S. at 213, n.10.
315. Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 646. But cf. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982) (child
pornography need not be patently offensive to be regulated).
316. See Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Effect of Statutes or Ordinances
Prohibiting the Sale of Obscene Materials to Minors, 93 A.L.R. 3d 297.
317. They must be obscene as to minors. Id. See also American Booksellers Ass'n, Inc.
v. McAuliffe, 533 F. Supp. 50 (N.D. Ga. 1981).
318. Erznoznik, 422 U.S. at 213-14.
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ulations will fail despite the liberalized obscenity standard for
minors.319
Second, statutes regulating obscenity for children must be nar-
rowly crafted to ensure that protected adult speech is not in-
fringed.32 0 Statutes may not, in the Supreme Court's language,
"burn the house to roast the pig" by preventing adults from ob-
taining non-obscene materials. 31 A state may not "reduce the
adult population to reading only what is fit for children. '322 Pre-
sumably, this applies to listening as well. Traditionally, regulations
that effectively prevent adults from having access to materials
which are not obscene as to them have been struck down.323 A
state cannot "effectively stifle an adult's access to communications
he or she is entitled to receive"'8 ' even if the statute intends only
to ban minors' access to albums containing songs barred for
children.
A state's banning of the sale of obscene records to minors
would likely have the same effect as a complete ban on the records.
Adults legally entitled to purchase the records would have diffi-
culty doing so because vendors are unlikely to stock the albums at
all. Store owners would have little incentive to carry obscene-for-
minors records, because the largest pool of potential buyers, mi-
nors, would be eliminated. In addition, widespread community
pressure could cause retailers to fear being branded distributors of
pornography. Boycotts and other pressure tactics might further
discourage retailers who sell these materials. Regulatory efforts to
date have run afoul of the Supreme Court's dictate that statutes
"be carefully drawn . . . and not be susceptible of application to
protected expression.'1525
319. Id.
320. M.S. News Co. v. Casado, 721 F.2d 1281, 1288 (10th Cir. 1983).
321. Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380, 383 (1957).
322. Id. But cf. Upper Midwest Booksellers v. City of Minneapolis, 780 F.2d 1389,
1395 (8th Cir. 1985) (refusing to extend Butler to display regulations).
323. See Rushia v. Town of Ashburnham, 582 F. Supp. 900, 904 (D. Mass. 1983) (pub-
lic display prohibition unconstitutional); American Bookseller Ass'n v. McAuliffe, 533 F.
Supp. 50, 56 (N.D. Ga. 1981); Tattered Cover, Inc. v. Tooley, 696 P.2d 780, 784-85 (Colo.
1985).
324. American Booksellers Ass'n v. Strobel, 617 F. Supp. 699, 704-05 (E.D. Va. 1985).
325. Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 522 (1972); see also NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S.
415, 433 (1963) ("government may regulate in the area [of first amendment] only with nar-
row specificity"); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 304 (1940) ("the power to regulate
must be so exercised as not, in attaining a permissible end, unduly to infringe the protected
freedom").
The Supreme Court's more recent decision in FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726
(1978) does not compel a different conclusion. In Pacifica, the Court held that regulations
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2. REGULATING NON-OBSCENE SPEECH
The effort to restrict "porn rock" has been aimed solely at the
sexual content of the songs.82  The PMRC is concerned that the
music is encouraging children to engage in violence, 2 experiment
with drugs and alcohol, 8" become pregnant,329 and commit sui-
cide.33 0 The expansion of states' efforts from regulating obscenity
to regulation of these other concerns would likely violate the first
amendment under the following analysis.
Presumably, states would likely justify their further regulation
of rock songs on grounds that such songs advocate illegal conduct
and induce antisocial behavior. In doing so, the states would rely
on the Supreme Court's decisions under the "clear and present
danger doctrine,"3 31 recognizing that speech which incites individu-
als to break the law is outside the constitutional guarantee of free
expression.83 2 In Brandenburg v. Ohio, the Court struck down an
aimed at limiting minors' access to indecent speech were not unconstitutional. Pacifica,
however, is distinguishable from the proposed music regulations. Pacifica concerned a re-
striction on the manner of dissemination. The speech was not completely banned. To the
contrary, under the regulations discussed in the text, the state would effectively eliminate
material from the marketplace, leaving the adult without the opportunity to purchase the
records.
326. The very first mailing sent by the PMRC, for example, "revealed that 'some rock
groups advocate satanic rituals, others sing of open rebellion against parental and other
authority, others sing of killing babies.'" Zucchino, supra note 176, at 17, col. 1.
327. A New Jersey county district attorney has blamed certain incidents of cemetery
vandalism on kids listening to rock bands. ROCK & ROLL CONFIDENTIAL, July 1986, at 3.
328. PMRC's Susan Baker testified that "the growing trend in music toward lyrics
that. . . glorify the use of drugs and alcohol." Rock Hearings, supra note 124, at 11.
329. During her testimony, Baker cited the country's growing teen pregnancy rate and
asserted that "pervasive messages aimed at children which promote and glorify suicide,
rape, sadomasochism, and so on, have to be numbered among the contributing factors." Id.
at 11-12.
330. Baker further testified that "[s]ome rock artists actually seem to encourage teen
suicide," citing as examples Ozzy Osbourne's "Suicide Solution," Blue Oyster Cult's "Don't
Fear the Reaper," and AC/DC's "Shoot to Thrill." Id. at 12. Another witness testified on the
suicide of Steve Bacher, who shot himself while listening to AC/DC's "Shoot to Kill." Id. at
13.
331. This doctrine has had a complex history in the Supreme Court, and has often
been misapplied. Justice Frankfurter noted that the doctrine was not designed to "express a
technical legal doctrine or to convey a formula for adjudicating cases." Pennekamp v. Flor-
ida, 328 U.S. 331, 353 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., concurring.) As Chief Justice Burger stated,
the doctrine "requires a court to make its own inquiry into the imminence and magnitude of
the danger said to flow from the particular utterance and then balance the character of the
evil, as well as its likelihood, against the need for free and unfettered expression."
Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 843 (1978).
332. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969). Furthermore, it is doubtful that a
state could justify its regulation because violent rock songs constitute nonprotected "fight-
ing words." This is because listening to music, like watching movies, "involves no face-to-
face confrontation or personal insultes [sic]". Note, The Censorship of Violent Motion Pic-
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Ohio statute criminalizing the advocacy of violence to achieving
political reform and established the modern test for prohibiting
speech.338 The Court held that a state may forbid advocacy of use
of force or illegal conduct only where "such advocacy is directed to
inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite
or produce such action."334
While some rock songs arguably may advocate illegal activity
such as drug use, it is done in a manner that does not rise to the
level of incitement required by the Supreme Court. This alleged
advocacy to commit illegal acts, however, is largely the general and
abstract expression of opposition to societal norms. These expres-
sions cannot be penalized because they fall short of clear and cer-
tain calls for unlawful conduct.35 The Brandenburg test would not
be met where a statement of opposition containing threatening
language is found to have been intended as a true threat.336
Realistically, the majority of musicians do not actually en-
courage lawbreaking, and where such controversial music is used, it
is often as hyperbole.3 Even where rock lyrics are viewed as en-
couraging illegal action, they certainly are not intended to produce
imminent disorder. At most, such lyrics advocate illegal action at
some indefinite future time and therefore cannot be prosecuted
under Brandenburg.335 The alleged link between violent behavior
and music is simply too tenuous to support the suppression of
lyrics.33 9
tures: A Constitutional Analysis, 53 IND. L.J. 381, 383 (1977-78) (footnote omitted).
333. Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 449.
334. Id. at 447 (footnote omitted). Mere teaching or advocacy of a theory is insuffi-
cient to meet this standard. Id. at 447-49.
335. See Bond v. Floyd, 385 U.S. 116 (1966) (statement expressing general opposition
to war held to be protected under the first amendment).
336. See Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705 (1969) (crude statement of opposition to
President held not to be equivalent to threatening his life). Although Watts was decided
prior to Brandenburg, the underlying first amendment concerns appear to be the same.
337. "Strong and effective extemporaneous rhetoric cannot be nicely channeled into
purely dulcet phrases. An advocate must be free to stimulate his audience with spontaneous
and emotional appeals for unity and action in a common cause." NAACP v. Claiborne Hard-
ware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 928 (1982).
338. Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 107 (1973) ("We'll take the fucking street" held
not to be punishable as intended and likely to produce imminent disorder); see also Craig v.
Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 376 (1947) ("danger must not be remote or even probable; it must
immediately imperil"); Gay Students Org. of the University of New Hampshire v. Bonner,
509 F.2d 652, 662 (Ist Cir. 1974) ("speculation that individuals might at some time engage
in illegal activity is insufficient to justify regulation by the state" under the first
amendment).
339. The PMRC claims of a causal link between violence and rock music is further
weakened by a recent study conducted at California State University, Fullerton. Two of Cal
State's researchers interviewed California high school students and found that the students
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The unavailability of the "clear and present" danger doctrine
as applied to rock music is apparent from the cases in which the
doctrine has been successfully invoked. Courts have traditionally
applied the doctrine to the most serious and important issues in
American political history. The Supreme Court has literally inter-
preted the doctrine's name in holding that restraints on freedom of
expression can be justified only when there is a grave and immedi-
ate threat to the nation's security.3 40 The "evil must be extremely
serious and the degree of imminence extremely high before utter-
ances can be punished."34 The Court has also interceded to pre-
vent speech urging the overthrow of the government, 42 advocating
political change by violent means3 43 and membership in an organi-
zation dedicated to upset of political order.344 It is unlikely that
this doctrine will provide first amendment protection to music be-
cause the actions allegedly encouraged by rock and roll music do
not rise to a nationally important level like treason and rebellion.
C. Regulation of Explicit Lyrics by the Federal
Communications Commission
The majority of efforts aimed at solving the problem of "porn
rock" thus far have urged the development and implementation of
a distinct system specifically designed to restrict rock music. But
those seeking to limit the dissemination of certain lyrics need only
turn to the Federal Communications Commission ("FCC"), an ex-
isting federal agency which arguably has the power to regulate rock
music. s45
perceived only seven percent of the lyrics of the mentioned songs to "refer to sex, violence,
drugs or satanism." The study concluded that 37 percent of the students "'didn't know'
what their favorite songs were about." DeCurtis, Study Refutes PMRC Claims, Says Kids
Don't Listen to Lyrics, ROLLING STONE, Aug. 14, 1986, at 11.
340. See Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 49-51 (1919). In Schenck, the Court
held that a letter encouraging opposition to the draft, which was circulated to men called
and accepted to military service during a time of war, was not protected under the first
amendment. But cf. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 627 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissent-
ing) (criticizing the Schenck decision).
341. Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 263 (1941).
342. Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204 (1919) (upholding Espionage Act convic-
tions); Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919).
343. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927) (upholding legislature's determination
that membership in an organization advocating political change through violence is danger-
ous). The Whitney decision was later overruled by Brandenburg. 395 U.S. at 449.
344. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
345. Senator Hollins has already noted the utility of employing the FCC to regulate in
case the "American public [decides not] to go along just with a nice hearing up in Washing-
ton." Rock Hearings, supra note 124, at 69-70. See also id. at 76-77 (also noting possible use
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1. BACKGROUND: THE FCC AND "DRUG-ROCK" LYRICS
The FCC first became involved with the issue of rock music
extolling drugs when the agency received a series of complaints,
most notably from then Vice President Spiro Agnew, on the mat-
ter.40 In response to these complaints, the FCC issued a Public
Notice to its licensee radio stations regarding the stations responsi-
bility to ascertain the meaning of the words of songs played by the
stations.3, 7 The FCC declared that the licensees were responsible
to determine "[w]hether a particular record depicts the dangers of
drug abuse, or to the contrary, promotes such illegal drug use."' 48
The issuance of the Public Notice by the FCC caused tremen-
dous concern over censorship in the record industry.34' Several
newspapers reported that the FCC had ordered radio stations not
to play drug-oriented music.3 50 The notice had a broad chilling ef-
fect throughout the industry. "Do not play lists" were circulated,
some disc jockeys were forced to sign promises not to play certain
songs, and one station owner rejected all lyrics which his manage-
ment could not interpret.35 1
Although several commentators asserted that the notice vio-
lated the first amendment,3 52 the Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit upheld the FCC's decision over the challenge
of several radio stations." The broadcasters' argument was based
on the Supreme Court's decision in Smith v. California, 4 which
held that a state cannot regulate obscenity by placing on the pro-
prietor the procedural burden of examining all publications sold in
of the FCC as a means of regulating rock).
346. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
347. 28 F.C.C.2d 409 (1971), clarified and modified, 31 F.C.C.2d 377 (1971), aff'd, Yale
Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 478 F.2d 594 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 914 (1973).
348. 28 F.C.C.2d at 409.
349. Such concern echoed the view of Commissioner Nicholas Johnson who found the
notice to be
an unsuccessfully disguised effort by the Federal Communications Commission
to censor song lyrics that the majority disapproves of; it is an attempt by a group
of establishmentarians to determine what youth can say and hear ... [and] it is
an unconstitutional action by a Federal agency aimed clearly at controlling the
content of speech.
Id. at 412 (Johnson, Comm'r, dissenting).
350. 31 F.C.C.2d at 377 (1971).
351. Comment, Drug Lyrics, the FCC and the First Amendment, 5 LOYOLA L.A.L.
REv. 329, 348 (1972).
352. Id. at 359-62; Note, Drug Songs and the Federal Communications Commission, 5
U. MICH. J.L. REF. 334, 349 (1972).
353. Yale Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 478 F.2d 594 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 914
(1973).
354. 361 U.S. 147, 153-54 (1959).
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his store. The D.C. Circuit, however, distinguished Smith from the
case before it by noting that a radio station's burden of examina-
tion differs from a bookstore's because a station needs to review a
smaller number of songs."' 5
The court ruled that awareness of the lyrics constituted part
of the licensees' responsibility to act in the public interest.306 The
court stated that the notice simply required the stations to have
knowledge of the songs it broadcast and did not censor rock
music. 3 57
2. THE FCC'S ABILITY TO REGULATE EXPLICIT LYRICS
The FCC has been delegated the broad power to regulate ra-
dio broadcasts under the Federal Communications Act.358 Pursu-
ant to this authority, the FCC may impose sanctions on "[w]hoever
utters any obscene, indecent, or profane language by means of ra-
dio communications.13 5  Therefore, the FCC can regulate music
that falls within these distinct classes even if the songs are other-
wise protected under the first amendment.3 0 Although this provi-
sion regulates protected first amendment speech, its constitutional-
ity has been upheld against a variety of challenges.3 '
The first category of speech regulated by the FCC is obscene
material. Like other would-be regulators, the FCC's actions are not
exempt from the Supreme Court standards for determining ob-
scenity. 62 The mere portrayal of sex therefore cannot be forbidden
on the radio; broadcasters' rights to present "provocative or un-
popular programming which may offend some listeners" is also rec-
355. 478 F.2d at 598. This distinction arises because " 'a radio station broadcasts for a
finite period of twenty-four hours each day; at any one time a bookstore may contain
thousands of hours' worth of readable material." Id.
356. Id.
357. Id. at 598-99. The court did not address whether music was entitled to first
amendment protection.
358. 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1982).
359. 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (1982). The sanction is a fine of not more than $10,000 or im-
prisonment of not more than two years or both. Id.
360. The three categories "are written in the disjunctive, implying that each has a
separate meaning." Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. at 739-40. This article's discussion will be
limited to obscenity and indecency because there are very few songs that contain profane
speech because of marketplace considerations.
361. Tallman v. United States, 465 F.2d 282 (7th Cir. 1972) (rejecting argument that
statute is unconstitutional because it lacks scienter requirement); Gagliardo v. United
States, 366 F.2d 720 (9th Cir. 1966) (rejecting similar argument). See also Pacifica Found.,
438 U.S. at 738 (upholding FCC's authority to regulate indecent speech).
362. Sonderling Broadcasting Corp., 27 Rad. Reg. 2d (P&F) 285 (1973), aff'd sub nor.,
Illinois Citizens Comm. v. FCC, 169 App. D.C. 166, 515 F.2d 397 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
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ognized. s3 s Likewise, songs that portray mayhem and violence may
not be prohibited for that reason alone.364
While the number of songs affected by the FCC's power to
regulate obscenity may be small, the FCC's power over indecent
speech is more ominous. The FCC's broad power to regulate inde-
cent speech, which may be defined as including some non-obscene
matter, includes the ability to prevent that, but for being broad-
cast on the airwaves, would be protected by the first amend-
ment.3 65 The Supreme Court in FCC v. Pacifica Foundation66 rec-
ognized a two-part rationale for the distinction accorded radio
broadcasts. 6 7 The Court first noted that:
the broadcast media have established a uniquely pervasive pres-
ence in the lives of all Americans. Patently offensive, indecent
material presented over the airwaves confronts the citizen, not
only in public, but also in the privacy of the home, where the
individual's right to be left alone plainly outweighs the First
Amendment rights of an intruder.3
6 8
Because the radio broadcast invades this sphere, offensive, yet not
obscene speech can be prohibited. Second, the Court asserted that
"broadcasting is uniquely accessible to children, even those too
young to read" and that the difficulty of shielding minors from in-
decent programming justifies special treatment of such
programming.36 9
The Pacifica decision confers extensive authority on the FCC
to regulate indecent rock lyrics.37 0 The FCC's definition of inde-
363. Sonderling Broadcasting Corp., 27 Rad. Reg. 2d at 287. See also WHUY Eastern
Education Radio, 18 Rad. Reg. 2d (P&F) 860, 865 (1970) (use of profane language not
obscene).
364. In re The Polite Society, Inc., 35 Rad. Reg. 2d (P&F) 39 (1975).
365. Note, FCC May Regulate Broadcast of Non-Obscene Speech, 53 TUL. L. REv.
273, 283 (1978); Comment, The FCC May Constitutionally Sanction a Radio Station for
Broadcasting Language which is Indecent but not Obscene, 47 U. CIN. L. REv. 678, 684-85
(1978).
366. 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
367. Such a distinction is consistent with the Supreme Court's holding in Joseph Bur-
styn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 502-503 (1952), that each method of communication cre-
ates its own unique first amendment difficulties. In Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395
U.S. 367, 388-90 (1969), the Supreme Court held that broadcasting is entitled to less protec-
tion under the Constitution than the print press because of the scarcity of the public air-
waves. But cf. FCC v. League of Women Voters of California, 468 U.S. 364, 378-79 n.12
(1984) (questioning continuing viability of scarcity rationale used in Red Lion).
368. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 748 (citation omitted). The Court noted that "prior warnings
cannot completely protect the listener or viewer from unexpected program content." Id. at
748-49.
369. Id. at 749-50.
370. Several commentators have criticized Pacifica for its scaling back of first amend-
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cency includes songs which are merely vulgar or sexual in nature,
and would probably include several songs identified by the PMRC.
The FCC recently increased the possibility of its regulatory effect
on musicians by reformulating its indecency test, in response to a
series of controversial talk show programs on rock-oriented sta-
tions. 71 This power represents a significant threat to rock music's
status as protected expression. The broadcast of many songs, even
though not obscene, would make radio stations vulnerable to sanc-
tions should the Commission decide to prosecute them.
This extensive power to regulate many rock lyrics is, however,
subject to several constraints. The first is the anti-censorship pro-
vision of the Communications Act, which forbids the FCC from
"interfer[ing] with the right of free speech by means of radio
communications." 72
Second, the FCC's discretion is circumscribed by its own pol-
icy not to intrude on individual stations' programming decisions.3 73
The FCC has traditionally refused to employ its licensing author-
ment rights. See Note, "Filthy Words": One Man's Lyric or Broadcasting's Indecency?, 34
U. MIAMi L. REV. 147, 150 (1979) (Pacifica "reflects. . . a cutback in the established mean-
ing and reach of the first amendment"); Comment, The Federal Communications Commis-
sion May Impose Sanctions on Broadcasters for the Presentation of Indecent Language
Without Violating the Statutory Prohibition of Censorship or the First Amendment, 28
DRAKE L. REv. 745, 757 (Pacifica "threatens the vitality of first amendment rights"); Com-
ment, supra note 365, at 683 (Pacifica "will have a significant chilling effect on the broad-
cast media").
371. Pacifica affirmed the FCC's earlier standard for determining whether a broad-
casted matter is indecent. Under that standard, indecency is
intimately connected with the exposure of children to language that describes, in
terms patently offense [sic] as measured by contemporary community standards
for the broadcast medium, sexual or excretory activities and organs, at times
when there is a reasonable risk that children may be in the audience. Obnoxious,
gutter language describing these matters has the effect of debasing and brutaliz-
ing human beings by reducing them to their mere bodily functions and we be-
lieve such words are indecent within the meaning of the statute and have no
place on radio when children are in the audience. In our view, indecent language
is distinguished from obscene language in that (1) it lacks the element of appeal
to the purient interest. . .and that (2) when children may be in the audience, it
cannot be redeemed by a claim that it has literary, artistic, political or scientific
value.
In re Pacifica Found., 56 F.C.C.2d 94, 97 (1975), rev'd sub nom. Pacifica Found. v. FCC, 556
F.2d 9 (D.C. Cir. 1977), rev'd, 438 U.S. 726 (1978). According to the FCC, indecency is now
more broadly defined. Stuart, F.C.C. Acts to Restrict Indecent Programming, N.Y. Times,
Apr. 17, 1987, at Al, col. 3.
372. 47 U.S.C. § 326 (1982). The practical application of this provision, however, is
limited. There appears to be no decision where a court has invalidated an FCC decision by
invoking either section 326 or the first amendment." Note, supra note 352, at 339 n.31.
373. In re Starr WNCN, Inc., 48 F.C.C.2d 1221 (1974).
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ity to protect listeners from simply offensive programs3 74 and has
prohibited stations from preventing dissemination of merely objec-
tionable material.3 7 5 The Courts have long held that licensed sta-
tions have a right to select their own programming 70 which a few
extra-sensitive listeners should not inhibit.3 77 Finally, the first
amendment protections for broadcasting, although not as extensive
as other forms of expression, do provide some limit to regulatory
power. 3 7
To ensure the preservation of its first amendment rights, the
rock industry must aggressively assert these limitations on the
FCC's regulatory power. Failure to do so will undermine the art-
ists' rights of free speech by allowing unchecked application of
Pacifica's broad regulatory power.
IV. REGULATING LIVE ROCK PERFORMANCES
Although the primary focus of the PMRC campaign has been
on regulating allegedly obscene album lyrics, rock concerts have
not escaped scrutiny and criticism. Rock performers have been
blamed by local officials and citizen groups for a variety of ills, in-
cluding substance abuse, violence and the attraction of undesirable
elements to the community. 79 These concerns have led to a variety
374. In re the Meredith Corp., 37 F.C.C.2d 551, 556 (1972); see also Report and State-
ment of Policy Re: Commission En Banc Programming Inquiry, 25 Fed. Reg. 7291, 7293
(1960) (FCC "may not condition the grant, denial or revocation of a broadcast license upon
its own subjective determination of what is or is not a good program.").
375. Farmers Educational and Coop. Union v. WDAY, Inc., 360 U.S. 525, 528 (1959)
(prohibiting station from censoring allegedly libelous remarks by political candidate). An-
other example is where the FCC has declined to interfere with anti-Semitic broadcasts. In
re United Fed'n of Teachers, 17 F.C.C.2d 204 (1969); In re Anti-Defamation League of B'nai
Brith, 4 F.C.C.2d 190 (1966).
The FCC has renewed at least one license despite evidence of broadcasting objectiona-
ble material. Jack Straw Memorial Found., 21 F.C.C. 833 (1970), reconsideration denied, 24
F.C.C. 2d 266 (1970).
376. See, e.g., McIntire v. Win. Penn. Broadcasting Co. of Philadelphia, 151 F.2d 597
(3d Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 327 U.S. 779 (1946); Massachusetts Universalist Convention v.
Hildreth & Rogers Co., 87 F. Supp. 822 (D. Mass. 1949), aff'd, 183 F.2d 497 (1st Cir. 1950).
377. Zamora v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 480 F. Supp. 199 (S.D. Fla. 1979).
378. Banzhaf v. FCC, 405 F.2d 1082, 1100 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 842
(1969) (noting that first amendment is hostile to government regulations on speech, includ-
ing those by the FCC). The first amendment affords broadcasters "a strong presumption in
their favor, a presumption that extends to both entertainment and news ... [but] there is
no unabridgable first amendment right to broadcast comparable to the right of every indi-
vidual to speak, write or publish." 16B C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 573(a) (1985).
379. In Pittsburgh, Public Safety Director John Norton asserted that rock lyrics "are
provocative and pornographic. They incite violence." Norton's remarks followed a concert
by the group Run DMC in which 25 people were arrested on vandalism and assault charges.
ROCK AND ROLL CoN~mm-rLL, Aug. 1986, at 1, 2.
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of responses, each of which raises distinct constitutional problems
in light of the Supreme Court's holding that live performances are
protected speech.380
The first response was to restrict certain groups from perform-
ing based on the content and manner of presentation of their
speech. For example, the New York City municipal government, in
establishing a new concert facility, announced that the completed
structure would not be available to all performers.381 The facility
will only "present ... recording artists geared toward a mature
and safe audience. There will be no presentations which might at-
tract a rowdy crowd. 38 2 Such efforts raise first amendment con-
cerns because they are similar to the attempts by communities
during the 1960's and 1970's to limit appearances by various per-
formers. 83 With the exception of the public rock festival cases,
which are distinguishable on other grounds,8 the courts have uni-
formly held that these efforts abridge both the artists' and the
public's first amendment rights.3 5
The public forum doctrine also constrains these endeavors by
providing that the level of first amendment protection provided
depends upon the location of the speech. 86 If the speech occurs in
a public forum,'3 87 the state may regulate it only under narrow and
limited circumstances.88 Before determining the appropriate stan-
dard for regulation aimed at rock music, however, the different
380. See supra notes 48, 84. There is no merit to the position that the lyrics become
conduct because the performers are acting them out on stage. As Nimmer noted, "[Any
attempt to disentangle 'speech' from conduct which is itself communicative will not with-
stand analysis." 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 127, § 3.06[C] (1984).
381. RoCK AND ROLL CONvIDENTIAL, Aug. 1986, at 1, 2. The City Department of Parks
and Recreation granted $5 million to the development project.
382. Id., (citing the minutes of a meeting in the office of Queens Borough President
Claire Shulman).
383. See supra notes 78-93 and accompanying text.
384. See supra notes 91-93.
385. See supra notes 87-90 and accompanying text.
386. Calash v. City of Bridgeport, 788 F.2d 80 (2d Cir. 1986); M.N.C. of Hinesville v.
United States Dep't of Defense, 791 F.2d 1466, 1472 (11th Cir. 1986).
387. There are generally considered to be two types of public forums. First are the
traditional public forums that "have immemorially been held in trust for use by the public."
Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939). These include streets and parks, Perry Educ. Ass'n
v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983), as well as airports and other termi-
nals. Jews for Jesus, Inc. v. Board of Airport Comm'rs of City of Los Angeles, 785 F.2d 791,
795 (9th Cir. 1986).
Second are the limited purpose public forums that the government "has opened for use
by the public." Perry, 460 U.S. at 45. There are also nonpublic forums which are not "by
tradition or designation a forum for public communication." Id. at 46.
388. United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 173 (1983). See also Perry, 460 U.S. at 45
(government's power is "sharply circumscribed").
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types of public forums must be distinguished. For traditional pub-
lic forums, the state may exclude speech in one of two ways. First,
the state can enact reasonable time, place and manner restrictions,
provided they are content-neutral, narrowly tailored to serve a sig-
nificant interest and permit sufficient alternative channels of com-
munication. 89 Second, the state can adopt additional restrictions,
including content-based exclusions and absolute prohibitions on
speech, provided the state demonstrates that "its regulation is nec-
essary to serve a compelling state interest . . . [and] is narrowly
drawn to achieve that end." 90 The government can ban speech in
limited purpose public forums because these facilities need not be
opened to the public; but once made available to some performers,
efforts to restrict speech are governed by the traditional analysis. 91
Most live rock performances are held in civic auditoriums and
municipal theaters, both of which are generally considered limited
purpose public forums.392 Once the government opens these facili-
ties to speakers, concert promoters are accorded broad protection
from being denied access based on the government's disdain for
rock music. State and local officials are barred from restricting ac-
cess because "they disagree with, or disapprove of, the views to be
expressed;"393 nor may they "pick and choose [between] the philos-
ophies and ideological content of programs. 3 94 That the speaker
may have an alternative forum is irrelevant.3 9
Promoters attempting to produce rock concerts in nonpublic
forums are more vulnerable to regulation. Although first amend-
ment protection applies, 9 the state can limit access "based on
389. Perry, 460 U.S. at 45.
390. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 270 (1981); Perry, 460 U.S. at 46.
391. Id. at 46-48.
392. S.E. Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 555 (1975); Cinevision Corp. v.
City of Burbank, 745 F.2d 560, 570 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 2115 (1985).
Whether or not a facility is a limited purpose public forum depends on the government's
intent. "The court has looked to the policy and practice of the government to ascertain
whether it intended to designate a place not traditionally open to assembly and debate as a
public forum . . . [it] has also examined the nature of the property and its compatibility
with expressive activity to discern the government's intent." Cornelius v. NAACP Legal De-
fense and Educ. Fund, 105 S. Ct. 3439, 3449 (1985). Most rock concert facilities fall within
this test for limited purpose public forums.
393. Toward a Gayer Bicentennial Comm. v. Rhode Island Bicentennial Found., 417 F.
Supp. 642, 645 (D.R.I. 1976).
394. United States Serviceman's Fund v. Shands, 440 F.2d 44, 46 (4th Cir. 1971).
395. Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 163 (1939) ("one is not to have the exercise of
his liberty of expression in appropriate places abridged on the plea that it may be exercised
in some other place"); Cinevision Corp., 745 F.2d at 576 n.19 (city may not exclude en-
tertainment "simply because there may be alternative forums where they could perform").
396. Perry, 460 U.S. at 49.
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subject matter and speaker identity so long as the distinctions
drawn are reasonable in light of the purpose served by the forum
and are viewpoint neutral. 3 97 The government can thus reject
speakers who are not members of the class for whose benefit the
facility was created or whose topic is outside the purpose of the
forum. 9 8
Significant restraints limit this regulatory power and provide
the music industry with formidable protection from local officials.
Thus, officials should not be able to prohibit only rock concerts
while permitting other types of performances. Those with the
power to control the events scheduled for these facilities may not
deny musicians access simply because they find the band's songs
and performance offensive. Officials violate the first amendment
when they deny "access to a speaker solely to suppress the point of
view he espouses." 99 Under this analysis, the personal predilection
of the local official not to provide access for a rock concert is irrele-
vant. Furthermore, hostility to rock concerts cannot serve as the
basis for excluding them even from nonpublic forums. Therefore,
attempts to deny certain "undesirable" rock artists entry to stadi-
ums and concert halls cannot endure first amendment analysis.'0 0
A second means employed by communities to limit concerts is
to enact outright prohibitions on certain rock performances. One
city has already approved an ordinance barring unaccompanied
minors under the age of fourteen from attending "obscene" con-
certs.0 1 Several other cities are studying the effect of this ordi-
nance before enacting similar legislation. 40 2
Under the first amendment, however, cities cannot simply ban
speech because it is considered harmful to children. All legislation
397. Cornelius, 105 S. Ct. at 3451. The standard for public forums differs because they
occupy a "special position in terms of first amendment protection." Grace, 461 U.S. at 180.
398. Cornelius, 105 S. Ct. at 3451; Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298
(1974).
399. Cornelius, 105 S. Ct. at 3451.
400. See Cinevision, 745 F.2d at 571-72 (noting hostility to rock music).
401. San Antonio, Tex., Ordinance 61,850 (Nov. 14, 1985). The ordinance defines ob-
scene material as that which, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest of children
under 14, violates the prevailing standards in the adult community as to the suitability of
the performance for children, lacks serious artistic, literary, political or scientific merit and
describes or explicitly refers to one of eight sexual acts.
402. City attorneys in Memphis, Dallas, Waco, Austin, Wichita, and Boston have con-
tacted San Antonio requesting additional information on the ordinance. RocK & ROLL CON-
FIDENTIAL, May 1986, at 3. The ACLU considers the San Antonio ordinance "to be a test
case" and predicts that "[a] lot of other cities will be watching to see what the city does and
whether it holds up in court." Goldberg, Crackdown on Obscene Shows, ROLLING STONE,
Jan. 30, 1986, at 9.
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of obscene speech must comport with the procedural and substan-
tive safeguards established by the Supreme Court. 03
If a state's regulation is aimed at non-obscene speech, it is
questionable whether the state can justify its actions. "0 Even as-
suming that some performers' conduct at rock concerts is noncom-
municative speech, and therefore subject to broader regulation, a
community will be unable to impose constraints unless it can
demonstrate a non-content based important governmental interest
underlying its actions and prove that its specific means are nar-
rowly tailored to serve that interest.40 5
A final ground available to those seeking to restrict rock con-
certs is the states' authority to regulate non-obscene speech under
the twenty-first amendment.40 6 The Supreme Court has indicated
that the Constitution grants the states extensive authority to con-
trol expression in conjunction with their police power to regulate
the sale of alcohol.4 07 In California v. LaRue, the Supreme Court
upheld regulations limiting the type of entertainment permitted in
nightclubs with liquor licenses.408 The Court did so notwithstand-
ing its determination that the regulations would proscribe some
constitutionally protected speech. 09 In its holding, the Court
found that compliance with its obscenity test was an unnecessary
limitation on state authority to regulate adult entertainment in
bars.410
The interpretation of the Constitution in these cases allows
403. The general analysis of the constitutionality of an attempt to restrict or ban mi-
nors from rock shows would be similar to that already discussed in reference to rock lyrics
and a rating system. The same prior restraint and obscenity concerns are implicated. See
supra notes 172-325 and accompanying text.
404. See supra notes 249-52 and accompanying text.
405. A city cannot rely only on vague generalizations about inciting minors to engage
in illegal activity or other dangers in regulating concerts any more than it can in record
labeling or restricting access to albums. See supra notes 331-44 and accompanying text for a
discussion of this form of regulation.
406. U.S. CONsT. amend. XXI, § 2 provides that "[tihe transportation or importation
into any State, Territory, or possession of the United States for delivery or use therein of
intoxicating liquors, in violation of the laws thereof, is hereby prohibited."
407. J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTrrTiONAL LAW 1025 (2d ed. 1983).
Municipalities must properly delegate the authority to restrict expression at these facilities
under their police power. Grand Faloon Tavern, Inc. v. Wicker, 670 F.2d 943, 944 (11th
Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 858 (1982). Otherwise, the ordinance must satisfy the strict
scrutiny test. Krueger v. City of Pensacola, 759 F.2d 851, 854-55 (11th Cir. 1985).
408. 409 U.S. 109 (1972). See also New York Liquor Auth. v. Bellanca, 452 U.S. 714
(1981) (different standard applies in twenty-first amendment setting).
409. LaRue, 409 U.S. at 116.
410. Id. at 116-17. But cf. id. at 121 (Douglas, J., dissenting) ("Certainly a play which
passes muster under the first amendment is not made illegal because it is performed in a
beer garden.").
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states to prohibit certain live performances in establishments li-
censed to serve liquor even though such expression would other-
wise be protected. The rationale is that it is the sale of liquor,
rather than the performance, that is being regulated. The govern-
ment need only demonstrate that its restrictions are a reasonable
exercise of its powers under the twenty-first amendment and are
"rationally related to the furtherance of legitimate state inter-
ests." 11 Provided it can satisfy this two-prong test, a state has
broad authority to bar rock shows that some might consider offen-
sive or dangerous in any establishment serving liquor.
Rock performers are particularly vulnerable to such regulation
because of the important role small clubs play in the music indus-
try. Many artists are unable to utilize the larger public forum facil-
ities because of the artists' lack of notoriety and commercial suc-
cess. Thus, these artists often begin their careers in smaller liquor-
serving facilities. Legislation enacted to regulate the nature of live
performances at these establishments would affect a significant
number of musicians.
The states' regulatory power is not, however, entirely immune
from constitutional restrictions. The cases upholding the right to
bar certain types of entertainment in night clubs have concerned
sexually oriented activities such as topless dancing.41 Their appli-
cation to rock music, whose dominant theme is not generally sex-
ual in nature, would appear tenuous. The Seventh Circuit in Reed
v. Village of Shorewood recognized this principle and held that a
bar owner's challenge to a city statute prohibiting rock music at his
bar stated a constitutional cause of action.4 13 This decision indi-
411. See 16B C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 572 (1985); J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J.
YOUNG, supra note 407, at 1025. Municipalities, however, must have the properly delegated
authority to restrict expression at these facilities pursuant to their police power. Grand
Faloon Tavern, 670 F.2d at 944. Otherwise, they must satisfy the strict scrutiny test. Krue-
ger, 759 F.2d at 854-55.
412. See Grand Faloon Tavern, 670 F.2d at 943; Krueger, 759 F.2d at 851; Bellanca,
452 U.S. at 714. The LaRue decision does not authorize widespread regulation of all sexu-
ally-oriented materials. 409 U.S. at 109. As one commentator has noted:
Lower courts have broadly misinterpreted LaRue to authorize the prohibition of
all nudity in establishments licensed to dispose alcoholic beverages without re-
quiring that nudity or sexually oriented performances partake more of gross sex-
uality than of communication and without securing a showing that the combina-
tion of such entertainment and alcohol produces certain anti-social behavior.
Note, Using Constitutional Zoning to Neutralize Adult Entertainment-Detroit to New
York, 5 FORDHAM URBAN L.J. 455, 468 (1976).
413. 704 F.2d at 950-51. The court distinguished LaRue and Bellanca on the basis of
the statutory aim to regulate sexual activity at liquor serving establishments. (The Seventh
Circuit did not rule on the constitutionality of the Municipal Zoning Board's action, but
remanded the case to the district court for further inquiry).
19861
63
Goodchild: Twisted Sister, Washington Wives and the First Amendment: The Mov
Published by Institutional Repository, 1986
194 ENTERTAINMENT & SPORTS LAW JOURNAL
cates that a state's ability to restrict entertainment under the
twenty-first amendment is not so extensive as to permit a blatant
prohibition of rock music in these facilities.
V. ROCK VIDEOS
The development of rock video has spurred tremendous criti-
cism4 14 for its allegedly sexist and violent themes. 415 The PMRC, in
addition to urging that ratings be assigned to each video clip, has
pressured cable operators and networks not to run certain videos
or limit their showings to hours when children are not in the audi-
ence.4 " This section will briefly discuss the FCC's ability to regu-
late the content of videos broadcast on television.417
The FCC has the authority to regulate both indecent and ob-
scene videos displayed on network programs because of its broad
powers over the content of commercial television."" Although the
networks broadcast a significant number of rock videos, it is really
cable programming, particularly the Music Television channel
("MTV"), that the PMRC has targeted.41 9 These efforts, however,
are likely to fail because the FCC's dominion over cable is greatly
restricted.
The recently enacted Cable Communications Act has stripped
the government of much of its historic power to regulate cable.420
In addition, the courts have retreated from their initial position
that cable is identical to broadcast television for first amendment
purposes 421 with recent court decisions indicating that cable may
receive the equivalent protection accorded newspapers. 2 There-
414. See supra note 122.
415. A study by the National Coalition on Television Violence found that 44 percent
of all rock videos contained "violence or suggestions of violence," mostly between men and
women. Rock Hearings, supra note 124, at 154-55.
416. Love, 'Washington Wives' Set Their Sights on Video, ROLLING STONE, Oct. 10,
1985, at 18.
417. The sale of rock videos has yet to become a large industry and a discussion of the
state's authority to regulate them would be relatively unnecessary. If regulation affecting
rock videos is enacted, it would most likely come from the FCC.
418. This power would be drawn from the FCC's authority to regulate television. See
supra notes 346-78 and accompanying text for dicussion of FCC's regulatory power.
419. Love, supra note 416, at 18.
420. 47 U.S.C. §§ 521-559 (Supp. 1986).
421. See, e.g., Community Communications v. City of Boulder, 660 F.2d 1370, 1379
(10th Cir. 1981), (holding cable's natural monopoly justifies regulation) cert. dismissed, 486
US. 1001 (1982).
422. The scarcity rationale is at the foundation of the FCC's authority to regulate
television. Red Lion Broadcasting Co., 395 U.S. at 390-92. It does not apply to the print
press. Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 249-50 (1974). It is an open
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fore, both the FCC and local governments are generally prohibited
from imposing "direct restrictions on the content of cable broad-
casts" because of its status under the first amendment.
42
The FCC's power to regulate indecent programming broadcast
on cable is also limited. Several district courts have ruled that or-
dinances imposing sanctions on a cable licensee's transmission of
indecent material are unconstitutional.24 They have held that
Pacifica, which permits sanctions for broadcasting indecency, 12 is
"not applicable" and "is irrelevant," to cable. 26 Instead, they have
applied the Miller test to judge the permissible boundaries of state
regulation of sexually oriented materials, including indecent
speech.42
The rationale for these cases is that cable television is not as
pervasive a medium as broadcasting because it is "invited" into the
home and is available only after the viewer has made an affirma-
tive decision to purchase the service. 428 As a further restraint, the
Cable Communications Act only empowers the FCC to sanction
obscene speech; it has no authority to penalize indecent cable
expression. 42 9
This precedent prevents communities and the FCC from im-
posing penalties on videos broadcast over cable television that
have not been adjudged obscene. It provides a significant measure
of protection for stations like MTV that have been under increas-
ing attack from the PMRC and other organizations. This also rep-
question whether the scarcity rationale applies to cable. See Preferred Communications,
Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 754 F.2d 1396, 1404 (9th Cir.), ("the physical scarcity rationale
does not apply to cable") aff'd, 106 S. Ct. 2034 (1986). In Preferred, the Supreme Court did
not decide the precise issue and its language was ambiguous. It stated that cable "partakes
of some of the aspects of free speech and of the communication of ideas as do the traditional
enterprises of newspaper and book publishers, public speakers and pamphleteers." 106 S.
Ct. at 2307. The Court, however, then stated that its "activities would seem to implicate
first amendment interests as do the activities of wireless broadcasters." Id. See also Quincy
Cable TV, Inc. v. FCC, 768 F.2d 1434, 1449 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (overturning must carry rules,
noting "'scarcity rationale' has no place in evaluating government regulations of cable tele-
vision"); Omega Satellite Products Co. v. City of Indianapolis, 694 F.2d 119, 127 (7th Cir.
1982) ("frequency interference ... does not arise with cable television"). But cf. Home Box
Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 44-45 (D.C. Cir.), (applying scarcity rationale) cert. denied,
434 U.S. 829 (1977); Black Hills Video Corp. v. FCC, 399 F.2d 65, 69 (8th Cir. 1968).
423. Preferred Communications, Inc., 754 F.2d at 1403 n.6.
424. Cruz v. Ferre, 571 F. Supp. 125, 126 (S.D. Fla. 1983), aff'd, 755 F.2d 1415 (11th
Cir. 1985); Community Television of Utah, Inc. v. Roy City, 555 F. Supp. 1164 (D. Utah
1982); Home Box Office, Inc. v. Wilkinson, 531 F. Supp. 987 (D. Utah 1982).
425. See supra notes 321-29 and accompanying text.
426. Community Television, 555 F. Supp. at 1169.
427. Home Box Office, Inc., 531 F. Supp. at 994.
428. Community Television, 555 F. Supp. at 1169.
429. 47 U.S.C. § 559 (Supp. 1986).
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resents a meaningful restraint on attempts to chill video producers
and musicians from exercising their first amendment rights.
VI. CONCLUSION
Large segments of American society have never approved of
rock 'n' roll music. The songs have offended many, disgusted
others and remained unpopular with certain groups, spurring them
to oppose the music's expression and dissemination. Historically,
rock has always battled the censor.
Although it has been cited for everything from encouraging
teen suicide to corrupting American youth, rock 'n' roll has so far
been able to avoid direct censorship. The industry's good fortune,
however, may be changing. The recent crusade by several national
organizations to regulate "porn rock" has achieved successes that
have exceeded prior censorship efforts. No campaign has been as
well-organized, as well-financed or as politically well-connected as
the PMRC, which has also had the fortune to appear during a pe-
riod when the nation has been less tolerant of pornography.3
As its latest struggle to forestall suppression began, rock was
forced to wage its battle without the full benefit of first amend-
ment protection. This article has argued that the expression of
rock music is as entitled to this constitutional right as any other
form of entertainment. It asserts that music is a vibrant medium
for the expression of ideas, both cultural and political. It submits
that the arguments advanced to deny rock music recognition as
constitutionally protected speech are invalid because they largely
express their proponents' distaste for the songs. The Supreme
Court has long held that such feelings are insufficient to deny ex-
pression a first amendment safe harbor from state regulation.
Once accorded constitutional protection, rock lyrics are enti-
tled to the same procedural and substantive safeguards granted
other speakers. This article applies these protections to prevent
the actions suggested to restrict the songs. Although the first
amendment does not shelter obscene lyrics, it should protect much
of the music singled out by both the PMRC movement and the
430. The central manifestation of this tone is the Attorney General's Commission on
Pornography, which studied the problem of pornography and found a link between anti-
social behavior and sexually-oriented materials. It called for a wide range of formal and
informal measures to limit the dissemination of pornography throughout the country. N.Y.
Times, July 10, 1986, at B7, col. 1. Another illustration of this mood is the widespread with-
drawal of sexually-oriented materials from convenience stores. See supra notes 17, 224-29
and accompanying text.
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states and localities already implementing these criticisms into for-
mal legislation. Many of the songs are merely offensive or unpopu-
lar expressions of minority viewpoints which are topics within the
scope of the guarantee of free speech. Any legislative remedies are
likely to ignore the Supreme Court's requirements for the proper
regulation of expression.
It is not easy to defend some of the more recent lyrics. Before
society races headlong into broad restraints on rock music, it
would be wise to remember the continuing advice of Lord Devlin:
"[if freedom of speech] perishes, it will not be by sudden death
• ..It will be a long time dying from a debilitating disease caused
by a series of erosive measures, each of which, if examined singly,
would have a good deal to be said for it."' 1, When the passions of
the moment subside, the contribution rock has provided the Amer-
ican political process and cultural life will demonstrate the true
dangers of attempting to restrict it.
431. Quoted in Yale Broadcasting, 478 F.2d at 606.
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